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DATE 10-05-2016 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/21/2015

(U//~~FOUO~~) On September 14, 2015, [redacted] Platte River Networks, date of birth [redacted] social security number [redacted] was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted]. Also present for the interview was Department of Justice (DOJ) Attorney [redacted] and [redacted] attorney at the [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) As [redacted], [redacted] described his role at PRN as a general role with the client and not involved with technical details. [redacted] main concern is the general direction of the business. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) Platte River Networks (PRN) worked with an individual named [redacted] to identify business opportunities. In early 2013 [redacted] brought them a client opportunity who she claimed once worked as a public official. After submitting a bid to do the work, PRN became aware the contract they were bidding on was for the management of an email server hosting domains associated with BILL CLINTON, HILLARY CLINTON and their aides. PRN won the bid for the contract and the account was under the name CESC. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) PRN wanted to limit the employees working on the CESC server, so it was determined [redacted], who worked remotely on the server, and [redacted] who handled the server on-site, would be the technical team doing most of the work. [redacted] was aware that PRN picked up an old server from the CLINTON residence and delivered it to Equinix, a datacenter in Secaucus, New Jersey. PRN ordered and installed new server hardware at Equinix and migrated all CESC email from their old server to the new PRN provided server. [redacted] was aware that PRN maintained a back-up of the server known as a DATTO. The DATTO was located at Equinix and worked by taking snapshots of the server and maintaining that data for up to 60 days before it was deleted. [redacted] deferred to [redacted] for specifics. [redacted] was also aware of a BlackBerry Enterprise Server managed by PRN, but deferred to [redacted] on the specifics. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) In or around March 2015 [redacted] was involved in conversations with CESC where they requested to know what email they had, where it was, and how it was backed up. [redacted] and [redacted] handled this request and would know more details. CESC never asked b6 b7C

Investigation on 09/14/2015 at Denver, Colorado b3 b7E

File # [redacted] 302 - 22 Date dictated N/A

By S [redacted] SA [redacted] 9/21/15 10/13/2015

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for administrator rights to the PRN server or for physical access to the server at Equinix. [redacted] believed CESC was still a PRN client and were operating under the same contract they originally signed.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] didn't believe there was a successful intrusion attempt against the CESC email server run by PRN.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/26/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On May 23, 2016, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security number [redacted] was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] at the offices of Platte River Networks (PRN) located at 5700 Washington Street, Denver, Colorado 80216. Also present for the interview was [redacted] and via speaker phone [redacted] both attorneys at the [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not aware of a laptop containing an archive of email belonging to HILLARY CLINTON that was shipped to PRN around February 2014. [redacted] was not aware what became of the foregoing laptop. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] only recently was made aware of a CLINTON email archive file being transmitted to the Clinton Executive Services Corporation (CESC) around July 2014 and September 2014 by [redacted] was not aware of the request by CESC, or transmittal by [redacted], as it was occurring. [redacted] was not aware of what specifically was requested by CESC or exactly how [redacted] fulfilled the request. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not aware of any support PRN provided the CESC client from October 2014 to January 2015. [redacted] was not aware of any CESC request to delete, wipe or shred their email records. As a [redacted] would not pay attention to technical details of any PRN client. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) At this point in the interview, Agents displayed PRN provided records and email from the March 2015 timeframe. [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) In March 2015, when various media outlets reported a private email domain and server was used by HILLARY CLINTON, PRN decided to create an internal "share drive" and control access to only the PRN employees working the CESC account. [redacted] stated PRN did have back-ups of their own servers. PRN never deleted information pertaining to the CESC client and provided the FBI all records they maintained pertaining to CESC. b6 b7C

Investigation on 05/23/2016 at Denver, Colorado b3 b7E

File # [redacted] 302 ~ 98 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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(U//~~FOUO~~) In March 2015, [redacted] stated CESC requested an inventory of all their email content, to include where it existed. PRN employee [redacted] travelled to the Equinix data center in Secuacus, New Jersey where the CESC server equipment was located. [redacted] was not a party to the discussion involving CESC's request for inventory, therefore did not know specific instructions. [redacted] did not recall what [redacted] specifically found on the server equipment.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) After Agents displayed an email dated March 09, 2015 where CHERYL MILLS discussed preservation of materials, [redacted] could not recall any other request by any entity to preserve CESC related data.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] has no recollection of a conference call on March 25, 2015 or March 31, 2015 with CESC. [redacted] stated CESC never requested their email content by deleted, wiped or shredded. Recently, [redacted] was made aware that [redacted] used Bleachbit software to shred .pst email files containing CESC email content that was transferred to CESC. As [redacted] understood it, [redacted] created a "vehicle" to transfer email files from the live mailboxes of CESC email accounts. [redacted] then later used Bleachbit software to shred the "vehicle" but the email content still existed in the live email accounts.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was unaware of any PRN employee conducting manual deletions of the DATTO device used to back-up the CESC email server.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was unaware of any successful computer intrusion of the CESC server.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Notes of the interview and documents displayed to [redacted] will be maintained in a FD340 envelope and filed with the captioned investigation.

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FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/19/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On April 19, 2016, [redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] and social security account number (SSAN) [redacted] was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and [redacted] at the law offices of [redacted] located at [redacted] Washington DC 20005. Also present for the interview were [redacted] attorneys [redacted] and [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents, and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] is currently the [redacted] met President WILLIAM CLINTON and HILLARY CLINTON when he became an [redacted] at the White House in the fall of [redacted]. After his [redacted] served in various positions in the CLINTON White House and continued to work for President CLINTON after his presidency. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) In the years after President CLINTON left the White House, CLINTON's staff managed certain details related to the information technology needs of CLINTON's office. One of those needs required negotiating with an individual who owned several .com domains related to CLINTON's name. [redacted] recalled these domains to be presidentclinton.com, clintonfoundation.com, and owjc.com. Ultimately, negotiations were successful and the domains were purchased from the individual. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) In 2006 or 2007, JUSTIN COOPER obtained a private email server (Apple Server) for the office of President CLINTON. COOPER and [redacted] had several conversations about reliability issues related to the previous outsourced server and decided it would be best to have a server under their physical control at the CLINTON's residence in New York. COOPER handled the procurement and all aspects of server management, to include the creation of new accounts or any requests to move email. [redacted] believed [redacted] and [redacted] initially had email accounts on the Apple Server. [redacted] recalled a conversation with HUMA ABEDIN and COOPER regarding the addition of HILLARY CLINTON to the Apple Server. [redacted] thought it was a bad idea, but the issue had been decided by that point in time. [redacted] believed the addition of HILLARY CLINTON to the Apple Server occurred while she was in the Senate. CLINTON used BlackBerry devices obtained by COOPER to access her email. [redacted] was not involved in the decision to move to a new server (Exchange Server), but recalled it was located, as was the Apple Server, in the basement of the CLINTON's New York residence. b6 b7C

Investigation on 04/19/2016 at Washington, DC b3 b7E

File # [redacted] 302 - 70 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] 4/19/2016 b6 b7C

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(U//~~FOUO~~) COOPER notified [redacted] a few times each year about attempted intrusions of the system, but [redacted] could not recall any specific details. They shared a mutual concern [redacted] had too much private information about the CLINTONS and may have had access to some of their communications. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] had no knowledge regarding the following topics: b6 b7C

- discussions to move to the Exchange Server
- personnel involved in the decision to move to the Exchange Server
- domains on the Apple Server or Exchange Server
- users on the Exchange Server
- disposition of the Apple Server or Exchange Server after decommissioning
- classified information on Apple Server or Exchange Server
- conversations concerning federal records as it related to the Apple Server or Exchange Server
- backups of the Apple Server or Exchange Server
- Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities at the CLINTON's New York or Washington, DC residences [redacted] did recall Secure Telephone Units in New York and Washington, DC) b6 b7C
- Secure fax machines or secure computers at the New York or Washington, DC residences

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/09/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On June 6, 2016, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security number [redacted] was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] at the FBI Washington Field Office, 601 4th Street NW, Washington, DC 20535. Also present for the interview was FBI Intelligence Analyst [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] works for [redacted] a defense contractor specializing in the areas of missile, space, and intelligence. In addition, [redacted] owns [redacted] a company focused on domestic data acquisition which [redacted] established in [redacted] has several products to include [redacted] as well as other products drawn from the over 60 billion records in [redacted] possession. [redacted] Dark Horse Data, Inc. (DHD), a company owned by former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence REGINALD HYDE. DHD works with foreign data, can contract directly with the government, and frequently embeds its personnel with clients. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) In June or July 2015, [redacted] a senior staff member of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, contacted [redacted] out of concerns data from HILLARY CLINTON's email server might end up overseas. Specifically [redacted] wanted to determine if there was an intrusion into CLINTON's server and, if so, whether exfiltrated data fell into the hands of a foreign power. [redacted] was concerned any exfiltrated data could endanger her three sons, who are Marines. Additionally, she was upset as a citizen and Senate Staff Member that this situation could occur. Therefore, [redacted] asked [redacted] if it was possible to determine if CLINTON's server had been compromised. [redacted] stated he would have to look for data that was genuine, authentic, and relevant. [redacted] defined those three terms as follows: b6 b7C

- Genuine – data originating from CLINTON's server
- Authentic – data that had not been altered
- Relevant – data from CLINTON's server that was moved outside of the United States to a place where a foreign actor could access it

(U//~~FOUO~~) Since [redacted] did not have funding for the project described above, in August or September 2015 she met with NEWT GINGRICH and asked [redacted] to brief GINGRICH on the project. b6 b7C

Investigation on 06/06/2016 at Washington, DC b3 b7E

File # [redacted] 302 -91 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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[redacted] GINGRICH, and [redacted] were all bothered by the potential that data from CLINTON's server had been compromised. GINGRICH wanted to speak with others about the project and in December 2015, recommended [redacted] speak with [redacted] at Judicial Watch. [redacted] briefed the project as four phases to [redacted]. The phases were to determine if:

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- Phase 1 –CLINTON's server was directly or indirectly attacked
- Phase 2 –SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL's server was directly or indirectly attacked
- Phase 3 – data was exfiltrated outside the United States
- Phase 4 – data was exposed to a foreign actor

As [redacted] briefed the project, he raised the question of what the course of action would be if classified information was uncovered. The three discussed it and decided Judicial Watch's legal counsel should be consulted. [redacted] never received an answer, but was of the opinion that if he uncovered data he thought might be classified, he would be obligated to report it to the appropriate authorities.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) In January or February 2016, Judicial Watch's legal counsel advised the project was feasible, but could not involve accessing any systems without authorization. The project could review open source data following the four phases described above. After these initial discussions with Judicial Watch [redacted] concluded the motivation of Judicial Watch's actions was not centered on the elections.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] advised there are three potential funding streams for the types of projects his company undertakes. They can be funded by his company, a government contract, or a data arbitrageur. In this situation, the arbitrageur would invest in litigation on the prospect of a judge awarding the arbitrageur attorney's fees.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) In February or March 2016, [redacted] company, [redacted] was given $32,000 by Judicial Watch to proceed with Phase 1. Judicial Watch awarded the contract to [redacted] because they were confident he understood both the Deep Web and Dark Web. After receiving the contract, [redacted] had to determine the best place to obtain the necessary data for the project. Based on the terms outlined by Judicial Watch's counsel, CLINTON and BLUMENTHAL's respective servers were off limits, as were offshore servers. [redacted] turned to [redacted] a former executive at [redacted] a cyber intelligence company which ingests data from the Deep Web and Dark Web and, then, indexes the data. By leveraging [redacted] data, [redacted] could search the Deep Web and Dark Web without exposing his searches to the Internet. [redacted] paid [redacted] $2,500 to have [redacted] conduct searches based on search terms provided by [redacted] These search terms included, but were not limited to, HILLARY CLINTON, SIDNEY BLUMENTAL, and an Internet Protocol (IP) address range obtained from an email provided to [redacted] by Judicial Watch. In return, [redacted] provided the results of those searches to [redacted] which was the exclusive data source used by [redacted] for this project.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] reviewed the data provided by [redacted] and found files from BLUMENTHAL's server on a server in Romania. [redacted] believed BLUMENTHAL had a personal

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Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of [redacted], On 06/06/2016, Page 3

server because he found some of BLUMENTHAL's files on the server in Romania, but not any of BLUMENTHAL's emails. The Romanian server contained approximately 200 Microsoft Word, Excel, and other file types belonging to BLUMENTHAL.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In reference to a May 22, 2009 alleged intrusion of CLINTON's server appearing in a draft version of a report on [redacted]s project, [redacted] stated he could not recall where he learned of the hack or the specific date. [redacted] speculated it was possibly from a public report, but he had looked for the source and could not find it. Therefore, [redacted] planned to remove the reference from future iterations of the report. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) During [redacted]s review of the data obtained by [redacted] he found one sensitive Excel file listing the names of known or suspected jihadists in Libya. [redacted] added that a portion of the file was in Russian. The file did not come from BLUMENTHAL's server, but contained a reference to an IP address range that included the IP address of CLINTON's server. Upon viewing this file, [redacted] became concerned he had found a classified document and stopped the project. This work completed Phase 1 and [redacted] planned to deliver the final report to Judicial Watch soon. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] stated some of the BLUMENTHAL files were dated on or about January 2012, which was the same timeframe when [redacted] contacted [redacted] regarding the Libyan Rogue Nation Judgment Recovery Program (LRNJRP). [redacted] claimed he was hired by the Libyan opposition government to recover the assets of the MUAMMAR GADDAFI government. [redacted] also met with TYLER DRUMHELLER regarding the same matter. [redacted] speculated BLUMENTHAL, if involved in the LRNJRP, could have written the memos as a "shake and bake" tactic. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) A copy of the original interview notes and documents provided to the FBI by [redacted] during the interview are enclosed in a 1A envelope. b6 b7C

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/21/2015

On September 14, 2015, [redacted] Platte River Networks (PRN), date of birth [redacted] social security number [redacted] was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] Also present for the interview was [redacted] from [redacted] and Department of Justice (DOJ) Attorney [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following: b6 b7C

On or about January 2013, [redacted] of [redacted] contacted [redacted] regarding potential business with a high profile former government client. [redacted] had an existing relationship with [redacted] because she previously referred other clients from a family wealth asset management firm. The potential client's current email server architecture lost connectivity during events such as Hurricane Sandy, so they wanted better support than their existing arrangement. [redacted] with the assistance of other PRN personnel, put together a proposal and submitted it to [redacted] Once PRN was chosen as one of the three finalists for the contract, PRN was notified the potential client was WILLIAM CLINTON and HILLARY CLINTON, doing business through a company named CESC. After PRN won the contract, [redacted] took on a smaller role and [redacted] worked primarily with [redacted] and [redacted] CESC wanted to keep the number of individuals working on the project small, so PRN identified three people as the only personnel allowed to work directly on the CESC project. Those individuals were identified in a Service Level Agreement (SLA) signed in August 2013 as [redacted] (solution design), [redacted] (project manager), and [redacted] (help desk). [redacted] did approximately 90% of the work for CESC and [redacted] handled approximately 10% of the work. [redacted] role was to help with on-site work at Equinix, while [redacted] handled everything else. [redacted] was ultimately not needed to work on the project. b6 b7C

When [redacted] was asked to review an email he sent discussing a new email address for HILLARY CLINTON, [redacted] stated [redacted] could not answer the question for attorney-client privilege reasons. A copy of the email is attached to this communication in an FD-340. b6 b7C

PRN chose Equinix as the datacenter for CESC's new email server (hereafter, PRN server) specifically because it did not go down during Hurricane Sandy. This project was PRN's first time using Equinix. [redacted] transported CESC's existing equipment (hereafter, predecessor server) and transported it to Equinix, so the content of the predecessor server could be migrated to the new PRN server. b6 b7C

Investigation on 09/14/2015 at Denver, Colorado

File # [redacted]-302 -12 Date dictated N/A b3 b7E

By SA [redacted] 9/14/15 SA [redacted] 9/30/2015 b6 b7C

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[redacted] stated PRN used an outside firm, MX Logic, for spam filtering, but referred other technical questions regarding spam filtering, data migration, archives/backups, and Microsoft Exchange to [redacted] and/or [redacted]

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[redacted] had no knowledge of:

- Email servers used by CESC prior to the one transported by PRN to Equinix.
- The existence of classified information on either server.
- Discussions regarding federal records retention.
- Intrusions to the PRN server.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/26/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On May 23, 2016, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security number [redacted] was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] at the offices of Platte River Networks (PRN) located at 5700 Washington Street, Denver, Colorado 80216. Also present for the interview was [redacted] and via speaker phone, [redacted] both attorneys at the [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] for PRN, and in that role, had contact with PRN client CLINTON EXECUTIVE SERVICES CORPORATION (CESC). His points of contact at CESC were CHERYL MILLS, [redacted] and [redacted]. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not aware of a laptop containing an archive of email belonging to HILLARY CLINTON that was shipped to PRN around February 2014. [redacted] was not aware what became of the foregoing laptop. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not aware of a CLINTON email archive being transmitted to the Clinton Executive Services Corporation (CESC) around July 2014 and September 2014 by [redacted] b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not aware of any support PRN provided the CESC client from October 2014 to January 2015. [redacted] was not aware of any CESC request to delete, wipe or shred their email records. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) At this point in the interview, Agents displayed PRN provided records and email from the March 2015 timeframe. [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) In March 2015, when various media outlets reported a private email domain and server used by HILLARY CLINTON, [redacted] entertained the idea of hiring a third party company to conduct penetration testing of the CESC email server [redacted] recommended [redacted] from a company named [redacted] but the testing ultimately did not occur. b6 b7C

Investigation on 05/23/2016 at Denver, Colorado b3 b7E

File # [redacted] 302 -94 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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(U//~~FOUO~~) In March 2015, [redacted] recalled PRN employee [redacted] travelled to the Equinix data center, but did not know the purpose of the trip. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) After Agents displayed an email dated March 09, 2015 where CHERYL MILLS discussed preservation of materials [redacted] could not recall any other request by any entity to preserve CESC related data [redacted] recalled receiving some guidance by PRN attorneys to preserve data, but could not recall specifically. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] had no recollection of a specific conference call on March 25, 2015 or March 31, 2015 with CESC. [redacted] did recall conference calls with CESC that were run by PRN's attorney. [redacted] stated CESC never requested their email content by deleted, wiped or shredded. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was unaware of any successful computer intrusion of the CESC server. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) Notes of the interview and documents displayed to [redacted] will be maintained in a FD340 envelope and filed with the captioned investigation. b6 b7C

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FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/03/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On February 4, 2016 [redacted], home address [redacted] NY, mobile phone [redacted] was interviewed at the law offices of Bryan Cave LLP, 1155 F Street NW, Washington, DC 20004 by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] Department of Justice attorney [redacted] and [redacted] counsel, [redacted] were also present for the interview. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] first met President WILLIAM CLINTON and HILLARY CLINTON (CLINTON) in 1997 when he was assigned [redacted] to The White House as [redacted] At that time, [redacted] received a security clearance after a single scope background investigation was conducted. He served in The White House [redacted] to include traveling with the President, until 2001 when President CLINTON left office. On [redacted] President CLINTON's [redacted] told [redacted] the CLINTONs had been keeping an eye on him and would like him to join their New York family. [redacted] accepted the offer and on [redacted], drove to their Chappaqua, NY residence. For the first six months, [redacted] position was covered as part of the military assistance provided to every president who leaves office. [redacted] He then returned to Chappaqua where he primarily focused on [redacted] but ended up with many more responsibilities. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] recalled an Apple server in the basement of the CLINTON's Chappaqua residence, but does not remember when it was installed or by whom. It was a big box to the right of [redacted] with no external devices attached, however, it had an internal capability to backup data. [redacted] HUMA ABEDIN, [redacted] HILLARY CLINTON, JUSTIN COOPER, AND [redacted] had email accounts under the owjc domain housed on the server. [redacted] also used the server as a workstation. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] did not know of plans to install the server constructed by BRYAN PAGLIANO at the time it occurred. The server consisted of three thin black boxes mounted in a rack. [redacted] described himself as not technical and, therefore, could not speak to any details regarding this server. b6 b7C

Investigation on 02/04/2016 at Washington, DC b3 b7E

File # [redacted] 302 ~ 60 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] 3/16/16 b6 b7C

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] did not recall escorting anyone from Platte River Networks in June 2013 into the Chappaqua residence to remove the server described above.

(U//~~FOUO~~) HILLARY CLINTON's office was on the third floor of the Chappaqua residence. After she became the Secretary of State, the State Department (State) converted it into a sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF). During the installation of the secure lines for the SCIF, [redacted] stood at the door as an escort for the technicians. After that conversion, CLINTON was the only one who had the combination to access the office until it was decommissioned one to two weeks after her departure from State. It contained approximately three phones installed by State. [redacted] believed all three to be secure phones and described them as a black STU phone, a yellow phone, and a white phone. [redacted] did not know the differences in the phones. The office also contained CLINTON's non-secure desktop computer, a shredder, and a secure fax machine. [redacted] initially stated he only entered the SCIF once or twice, when CLINTON was present, to remove trash.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] later recalled a procedure established by ABEDIN with [redacted] at the beginning of CLINTON's tenure at State for situations when CLINTON needed assistance with the secure fax. When [redacted] was notified by State personnel of an incoming secure fax, he would locate CLINTON, follow her to the SCIF, and assist as needed with the incoming fax. He was never in the SCIF to receive a fax without CLINTON present and never physically picked up any of the documents received. If the fax was not working, State would sometimes send a courier with documents or a diplomatic pouch to the Chappaqua residence. On those occasions [redacted] would escort the courier from the gate to the door and the courier would hand the documents or pouch directly to CLINTON. [redacted] would also coordinate the repair of the fax when broken.

(U//~~FOUO~~) ABEDIN or CHERYL MILLS would sometimes notify [redacted] the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) would be coming via secure fax to the residence. As described above with other secure faxes, [redacted] would locate CLINTON and assist with the incoming secure fax. The PDB was also hand carried to the residence on occasion and [redacted] would escort the courier to CLINTON.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] periodically received emails from ABEDIN with attached documents intended for CLINTON. [redacted] would print the documents and give them to CLINTON, but does not know what happened to the documents after CLINTON was finished with them. [redacted] Last Name Unknown handled similar duties at CLINTON's residence in Washington, DC.

(U//~~FOUO~~) CLINTON had several BlackBerry devices over the course of time. When CLINTON had issues with one of them, [redacted] would ask COOPER for advice on how to fix it. [redacted] believed CLINTON had a State BlackBerry, but did not recall a secure mobile phone.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] did not recall setting up an Apple ID or iPad for CLINTON.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] did not recall a secure phone in CLINTON's bedroom.

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DATE 10-05-2016 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/23/2016

[redacted], Chief Executive Officer (CEO), was interviewed at his place of employment, [redacted] telephone number is [redacted] and his email address is [redacted] was advised that the FBI had identified 37 login attempts to the APPLE ICLOUD account of hdr22@clintonemail.com, originating from three [redacted]-owned IP addresses. [redacted] was provided with the IP addresses that made the login attempts. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] has approximately [redacted] employees at their main headquarters in [redacted] and an additional [redacted] employees in other locations. [redacted] They provide [redacted] has a large customer base including many US Government agencies and Department of Defense components. [redacted]

[redacted] provided the Agents with a demonstration of the [redacted] on a laptop in his office. [redacted] and others. That data is then [redacted]

[redacted] provides their clients with two basic services: 1) their security platform can be used to link and search for current social media information on the Internet; and 2) [redacted] can provide on-going social media monitoring for their clients. [redacted] explained that the [redacted] utilizes their continuous

Investigation on 03/23/2016 at [redacted]

File # [redacted]-CYBER-16 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted]

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monitoring service to generate alerts for new social media posts relating to current [redacted] Additionally, [redacted] provides that same service for all United States Department of Commerce employees, whether they are aware of it or not.

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Along with searching for [redacted]

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[redacted] confirmed that two of the three IP addresses shown to him belong to [redacted] [redacted] stated that the third IP address may have been assigned to them in the past, but that it was no longer active. The [redacted] is assigned to [redacted]

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[redacted] does not maintain historical logs for searches that are conducted by their clients. [redacted]

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then showed the Agents a screen on his laptop, where the username field was displayed without a corresponding password field.

To the best of [redacted] recollection, [redacted] was not hired by HILLARY CLINTON or anyone on her behalf. [redacted] attributed the login attempts to being conducted by one of their clients, utilizing the [redacted] platform. [redacted] then left the interview for a brief moment in order to verify that [redacted] was not conducting any continuous monitoring services for HILLARY CLINTON. When he returned, [redacted] confirmed that they are not. [redacted] stated that he had a co-worker of his search for CLINTON's name within their platform. In order to protect the FBI's inquiry at [redacted] had the co-worker search for CLINTON's name in the system, along with the names of two additional current Presidential candidates. The results were negative on all three searches.

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[redacted] was then informed that the hdr22@clintonemail.com email account was published in a NEW YORK TIMES article on March 02, 2015, and that the [redacted] login attempts occurred on the following day. [redacted] stated that this made sense to him. Given that information, he theorized that the login attempts were likely made by one of their "good guy" clients, possibly to conduct a damage assessment on the social media footprint associated with that email address. However, [redacted] stated that he could not verify his theory, as [redacted] had no additional data to corroborate it.

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[redacted] is amenable to future contact with the FBI.

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DATE 10-05-2016 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/14/2016

[redacted], Chief Executive Officer (CEO), [redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment, [redacted] telephone number is [redacted] and his email address is [redacted] Also present for this interview was FBI SA [redacted] was advised b6 b7C that the nature of the interview was to determine whether or not [redacted] had performed any penetration testing on the clintonemail.com domain. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] did not perform any penetration testing for the b6 b7C clintonemail.com domain. [redacted] recalled that the clintonemail.com domain was previously hosted at the PLATTE RIVER NETWORKS (PRN) Internet service provider in Denver, Colorado. [redacted] is good friends with [redacted] who is [redacted] at PRN. [redacted] recalled speaking with [redacted] about doing penetration testing on that domain, approximately six months prior the large media coverage of the private server. [redacted] provided security recommendations for the system; however, actual penetration testing did not ultimately occur.

[redacted] maintains a working business relationship with b6 b7C PRN. If a PRN customer wishes to have penetration testing performed on their network, PRN will then refer that customer to [redacted] Correspondingly, [redacted] will refer their customers to PRN, if they wish to harden their network systems subsequent to a [redacted] penetration testing assessment. [redacted] also leverages technical resources at PRN for other projects, including incident handling and forensic analysis. The two companies compensate one another with commission checks.

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Investigation on 04/12/2016 at [redacted] Colorado

File # [redacted] CYBER - 26 Date dictated N/A b3 b7E

By SA [redacted]

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[redacted] recalled sharing several emails with PRN employees regarding the clintonemail.com domain. [redacted] primarily dealt with [redacted], but remembered that there were a couple of other PRN employees included on the exchanges. [redacted] then went to his office and printed out several email between him and [redacted] Those printouts are enclosed for the file in a physical 1A envelope.

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[redacted] never had access to the clintonemail.com domain, nor do they host any of their company services on PRN networks. The extent of [redacted] interactions with PRN employees, related penetration testing, and the clintonemail.com domain are documented in the email exchanges that [redacted] provided during this interview.

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While reviewing the emails provided by [redacted] SA [redacted] identified one which references a public news article, where an individual named [redacted] had utilized a scanning tool called FIERCE to identify the addresses used for HILLARY CLINTON's (CLINTON's) personal email server. [redacted] provided that the referenced [redacted] provided that [redacted] formerly managed an Internet blog where he posted new hacks and exploits on almost a daily basis. A few years ago, however, [redacted] went dark and discontinued publishing his findings on the Internet. [redacted] provided that [redacted] goes by the name of [redacted] within the hacking community.

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[redacted] has known [redacted] for several years. The two of them share a passion for music. [redacted] recalled that [redacted] a business that put on large-scale rock concerts, which would rival that of a Madonna-sized concert. [redacted] the two share music as a common bond. Additionally [redacted] recalled that [redacted] a blimp company that provided aerial coverage over large public events.

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[redacted] recalled meeting [redacted] at a Colorado technical event, which [redacted] referred to the event as a leads event, which was a technical expo in Colorado where information technology experts could exchange ideas and network with one another. During that event, [redacted] spoke on a panel with [redacted] and a US SECRET SERVICE Agent, named [redacted]. During introductions with one another prior to the event, [redacted] recalled USSS SA [redacted] stating to [redacted] that he had recently served a warrant at PRN. [redacted] surmised that statement to relate to the on-going investigation of CLINTON's email server. Agent Note: A follow-up call to USSS SA [redacted] identified

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warrant referenced in that conversation was served in support of different matter.

[redacted] views [redacted] as a "good guy", who is caught in a bad situation. [redacted] has stated his frustrations to [redacted] regarding the CLINTON email investigation. [redacted] stated that it has had a direct impact on PRN's business, and that they have spent a large amount of money in legal fees related to the matter. Primarily, [redacted] is concerned over the negative publicity that PRN has received in the news media. Additionally, PRN has been asked to step out of certain requests for proposals (RFP's) as a result of the investigation.

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In addition to [redacted], [redacted] has also had limited interactions with PRN's [redacted] Last Name Unknown (LNU). However, [redacted] has been [redacted] primary point of contact at PRN.

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When asked whether or not [redacted] utilizes the [redacted] social media cyber security product, [redacted] stated that they do not.

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[redacted] is amenable to future contact with the FBI.

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DATE 10-06-2016 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/24/2015

[redacted], date of birth (DOB) [redacted], was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and [redacted] at the law offices of DAY PITNEY located at One Canterbury Green, Stamford, CT 06901. Also present for the interview were DAY PITNEY attorneys [redacted] and [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents, and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] is currently employed as [redacted] at DATTO located at 101 Merritt 7, Norwalk, CT 06851, and has held that position for [redacted]. Prior to that, [redacted] was [redacted] and worked partly as the [redacted] to DATTO. b6 b7C

DATTO is a company that provides products and services to small businesses related to cloud storage and disaster recovery. DATTO had an established relationship with PLATTE RIVER NETWORKS (PRN) and provided them server back-up and recovery services for some time. DATTO's relationship with PRN was already established in 2013 when PRN acquired a new contract to manage an email server with a client known to DATTO as CESC. At the time, DATTO did not know who PRN's client CESC was.

When PRN reached out to DATTO in May 2013 to provide back-up services for the CESC client server, PRN requested a slightly different service from DATTO than they normally request. Typically, PRN would request that DATTO back-up remotely to DATTO's secure cloud. For the CESC client server, PRN requested that the server be backed-up

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locally and privately. At the time of this request, it was not only a new request for PRN, but a non-standard process for DATTO. In order to affect the private, local storage needs for PRN's CESC client, PRN ordered a SIRIS 2000 device from DATTO, but forgot, or did not know, to also order the private node that the data would be routed to and stored on. Because of this, the default on the DATTO configured SIRIS 2000 sent the CESC server back-up data remotely to DATTO's secure cloud and not to a local private node. This default configuration on the SIRIS 2000 has since been changed.

[redacted] stated that PRN must have known data was being logged in DATTO's secure cloud and not on a local private node. As evidence, [redacted] stated the partner portal, that PRN had log-in credentials to, had a feature displaying backed-up data and options to delete cloud or delete local. [redacted] stated PRN would have seen their back-ups under delete cloud. Additionally, [redacted] was shown a document provided by DATTO indicating email records were manually deleted from the DATTO secure cloud back-ups of the PRN CESC server in March 2015. [redacted] stated that it couldn't have been a DATTO employee that deleted those email records, because there would have been a work ticket indicating as much. Concerning the IP addresses associated with the March 2015 deletions, [redacted] thought [redacted] was the DATTO relay server handling the connection and [redacted] was a local host connection. [redacted] stated PRN had log-in credentials on the partner portal that weren't tied to one employee, so he did not know who from PRN logged in at any given time.

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Data is sent to the DATTO cloud through Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) from the local DATTO device purchased by the client. Multiple DATTO devices, for different clients, are synced to one node for unified data storage. Each DATTO device is segmented on that node and only writes to a directory paired with the corresponding device. The data on the servers is partially encrypted and a password would be needed to access remotely.

The DATTO server farm is housed in Pennsylvania, multiple levels underground, in a secure facility. In order to access the facility, you must be a client there and process through security, which includes a biometrics scan. The cages that house the servers are also locked.

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DATTO virtualizes systems locally on the DATTO appliance or remotely in the DATTO secure cloud. As part of this process, an automatic test is conducted to verify the virtualization where screenshots of the windows login screen are sent to DATTO clients. Many of DATTO's clients, to include PRN, would occasionally get "backup verification failure" notices showing their DATTO device was unbootable. [redacted] indicated this notice occurred very frequently and almost always was an issue involving the virtual environment and not DATTO actually failing to maintain back-ups of the associated servers. This issue was usually resolved with a handful of solutions to include changing drivers and controllers or lengthening windows for verification.

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DATTO never altered or configured the retention settings regarding the period of time or frequency that the PRN server was backed up. The retention settings are set by the client.

On 08/13/2015, after the CESC client was known to DATTO and lawyers became involved regarding the retention, preservation and production of records regarding the CESC client, DATTO shipped a new SIRIS 2000 device to PRN. The impetus to the shipment was the realization that the SIRIS device originally purchased by PRN was not encrypted. The provision of the new SIRIS device was initiated by DATTO and brokered by their attorney, [redacted]. DATTO provided the device to have increased security while also ensuring continuity of operation on the server.

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[redacted] stated the DATTO secure cloud is frequently scanned and he has no knowledge of any intrusion or deep penetration of their systems. [redacted] stated the best place to look for network intrusion is the system logs.

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[redacted] never discussed federal records retention or classified information with any representative of PRN or CESC.

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DATE 10-05-2016 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/30/2015

[redacted] Records Management Division, Records Information and Dissemination Section, Winchester, Virginia was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] resides at [redacted] telephone [redacted] has been employed in the Records Management Division for the past [redacted] years. b6 b7C

Approximately 6 weeks ago, [redacted] received an email from [redacted] of the Department of State (STATE) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) section. [redacted] email enclosed copies of 5 email communications from former Secretary of State HILLARY CLINTON's private email account which STATE believed may contain "FBI equities." STATE requested the FBI conduct an appropriate classification review of the emails prior to their scheduled FOIA public release. [redacted] advised these 5 emails were transmitted to him on a classified email system but were marked unclassified. [redacted] recognized that at least 1 of the emails appeared classified and forwarded same to the Counterterrorism Division (CTD) for classification review. These emails were reviewed by [redacted] and [redacted] of CTD. [redacted] relayed these findings to STATE as per protocol. b6 b7C b3

Approximately 1 week later, STATE's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) contacted [redacted] and questioned the FBI's SECRET//NOFORN determination. [redacted] could not recall the name of the caller. According to OLC, [redacted] does not have an official government and therefore it believed the FBI could not classify a document based on the FGI caveat. OLC also advised that they, not the FBI, are the judge of potential harm to foreign governments and therefore the FBI did not have the right to classify a document based on those conditions. [redacted] as such remained classified at the SECRET//NOFORN level. [redacted] firmly b6 b7C b3

Investigation on 07/30/2015 at Washington, D.C. b3 b7E

File # [redacted] Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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[redacted] b6 b7C

believed, based on his position as an Original Classification Authority (OCA), that the email was classified properly and accurately.

Shortly thereafter, [redacted] received a call from [redacted] of the International Operations Division (IOD) of the FBI, who "pressured" him to change the classified email to unclassified. [redacted] indicated he had been contacted by PATRICK KENNEDY, Undersecretary of State, who had asked his assistance in altering the email's classification in exchange for a "quid pro quo." [redacted] advised that, in exchange for marking the email unclassified, STATE would reciprocate by allowing the FBI to place more Agents in countries where they are presently forbidden.

Following the above exchange, [redacted] was summoned to an "all agency" meeting at STATE to discuss matters pertaining to the classification review of pending CLINTON FOIA materials. [redacted] official from STATE, along with representatives from CIA, DIA and other government agencies were present. PATRICK KENNEDY presided over the meeting. During the conversation, a participant specifically asked whether any of the emails in question were classified. Making eye contact with [redacted] KENNEDY remarked, "Well, we'll see." [redacted] believed this was reference to the FBI's categorization of the SECRET//NOFORN email which KENNEDY was attempting to influence. In a private meeting with KENNEDY following the all agency meeting, KENNEDY asked [redacted] whether the FBI could "see their way to marking the email unclassified?" According to [redacted] KENNEDY spent the next 15 minutes debating the classification of the email and attempting to influence the FBI to change its markings. Since [redacted] continued to assert that the email was appropriately marked SECRET//NOFORN, KENNEDY asked who else in the FBI he could speak with on the matter. [redacted] referred KENNEDY to MICHAEL STEINBACH, Assistant Director of CTD.

[redacted] was then present during a conference call involving KENNEDY and STEINBACH in which KENNEDY continued to pressure the FBI to change the classified markings on the email to unclassified. STEINBACH refused to do so. Prior to ending the conversation, KENNEDY asked whether the FBI or STATE would conduct the public statements on the matter. STEINBACH advised KENNEDY that the FBI would not comment publicly on the matter. The conference call ended and, according to [redacted] the Associated Press (AP) published the story within the hour. Former Secretary of State CLINTON appeared in front of the press

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shortly thereafter to deny having sent classified emails on her private email server.

[redacted] believes STATE has an agenda which involves minimizing the classified nature of the CLINTON emails in order to protect STATE interests and those of CLINTON. Since the above incidents, [redacted] has received approximately 8 or 9 more emails from STATE involving FBI equities, 1 of which he believes may be classified SECRET//NOFORN.

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FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/03/2015

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) [redacted] International Operations Division (IOD), who is currently [redacted] retirement on [redacted] was interviewed in person by FBI Special Agents [redacted] and Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [redacted] at a [redacted] located at [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) As [redacted] interacted with PATRICK F. KENNEDY, U.S. Department of State (DoS) Under Secretary of State for Management. [redacted] and KENNEDY's relationship was professional. The two got along, but did not agree on many matters related to the FBI's role and authority overseas. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) In late May or early June, [redacted] found a note on his desk indicating KENNEDY contacted him. [redacted] was surprised, as both his Assistant Director (AD) JOHN BOLES and Executive Assistant Director (EAD) ROBERT ANDERSON, had both been trying to contact KENNEDY for months without response. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) When [redacted] returned KENNEDY's call, KENNEDY asked [redacted] assistance in changing a classification of FBI information contained in an e-mail. KENNEDY did not provide [redacted] with the e-mail, however, he told [redacted] that [redacted] of FBI's Records Management Division (RMD) [redacted] was the one that told KENNEDY the document was classified. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) KENNEDY told [redacted] that the FBI's classification of the e-mail in question caused problems for KENNEDY and KENNEDY wanted to classify the document as "B9." KENNEDY further stated that the "B9" classification would allow him to archive the document in the basement of DoS never to be seen again. [redacted] was not sure of what KENNEDY meant by a "B9" classification [Note: B9 may be a reference to a FOIA exemption]. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) Not yet knowing the e-mail's content, [redacted] told KENNEDY he would look into the e-mail matter if KENNEDY would provide authority concerning the FBI's request to increase its personnel in Iraq. b6 b7C

Investigation on 09/03/2015 at Washington, DC b3 b7E

File # [redacted] 302 ~ 2 Date dictated N/A

By SSA [redacted] SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Following his conversation with KENNEDY, [redacted] contacted [redacted] to discuss the e-mail of concern. [redacted] told [redacted] the e-mail of KENNEDY's concern was classified by the FBI Counterterrorism Division (CTD) and was related to the attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi. Following his conversation with [redacted] contacted KENNEDY and informed him that there was no way he could assist KENNEDY with declassifying the information contained in the e-mail.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] told ANDERSON and BOLES about KENNEDY's request to declassify the e-mail and [redacted] response denying the ability to do so, however, [redacted] did not discuss the content of the e-mail with them.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Agent notes are maintained in a 1A envelope.

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DATE 10-05-2016 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/19/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On December 16, 2015, [redacted], Owner and Chief Technology Officer, [redacted] was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted]. Also present for the interview was [redacted] attorney, [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] founded [redacted] while living in Chicago and currently has a family of approximately [redacted] employees comprised of full and part-time employees, as well as subcontractors. In early 2013, [redacted], a business associate of [redacted], contacted her about a client who needed a new email server. After [redacted] expressed an interest in the project and understood the clients were HILLARY AND WILLIAM CLINTON, [redacted] put her in contact with CHERYL MILLS. A few other [redacted] personnel assisted with invoicing and technical aspects of the contract, but [redacted] did most of the work herself. [redacted] primary contacts were MILLS and BRYAN PAGLIANO; MILLS helped produce the proposal and PAGLIANO assisted in developing the requirements for the server architecture. [redacted] started the discussion by providing a range of options from low-cost Gmail to a more sophisticated private server. She understood the client's impetus for the project to be reliability/uptime and security in the wake of a situation where the client's private server housed in their residence experienced one week of downtime because of a storm. The client selected the private server from the options provided by [redacted]. Backup systems were planned for Phase 2 of the project, but [redacted] was not involved in those decisions. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) As part of the initial conversations with PAGLIANO and MILLS, [redacted] knew at one point the domains and number of email accounts on the server, but could not recall those details. Additionally [redacted] had no knowledge of email servers owned or operated by the client prior to the equipment maintained by PAGLIANO. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) After the client selected a private server, [redacted] contacted two firms she had prior experience with: GRAVITAS, a large Information Technology firm, and PLATTE RIVER NETWORKS (PRN), a small boutique firm. After the client selected PRN, [redacted] worked with MILLS, PAGLIANO, and [redacted] to develop the details of the project. [redacted] was only involved in one or two meetings; [redacted] believed he was curious about the process. PAGLIANO handled the technical aspects of the project and MILLS handled strategic concerns. As PRN took over day-to-day management, [redacted] involvement gradually faded out. The client occasionally reached out for assistance and [redacted] would help where she could. Payment for her services was billed for the entire task, not hourly, so she did not charge any fee for this assistance. b6 b7C

Investigation on 12/16/2015 at New York, NY b3 b7E

File # [redacted] 302 - 49 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] 1/19/2016 b6 b7C

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] believed a CloudJacket-type security device was part of the project design, so when it wasn't part of the initial install, she pushed for the implementation of it after the migration from the PAGLIANO server to the PRN server. During the migration, she was not in the weeds, but knew enough to know it was done correctly from a security standpoint. [redacted] was not aware of any security intrusions or compromises while she was involved in the day-to-day operations of the transition, nor was she brought back in after the fact on any security issues. In addition to the CloudJacket, as part of the security considerations, [redacted] discussed transitioning from BlackBerries to the iPhone with the client, as well as blocking international access to the server. Ultimately, the client chose to stay with BlackBerries and international blocking was declined because the client frequently traveled internationally.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Since press reports of [redacted] association with PRN and the CLINTON's went public, [redacted] and some partners contracted Depth Security to conduct Vulnerability Threat Assessments for some of their shared clients. [redacted] was not aware of any such assessment conducted on the CLINTON's server.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] had no knowledge of the following topics as they relate to the PAGLIANO or PRN servers:

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- moving emails to a new domain
- laptop backups
- temporary backups
- classified information
- federal records

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DATE 10-05-2016 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/26/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On May 23, 2016, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] at the offices of Platte River Networks (PRN) located at 5700 Washington Street, Denver, Colorado 80216. Also present for the interview was [redacted] and via speaker phone, [redacted] both attorneys at the [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was given PRN administrator credentials to the Clinton Executive Service Corporation (CESC) email server, but could not recall logging in to the server. [redacted] understood [redacted] were in charge of handling the CESC client [redacted] recalled he assisted with the CESC client less than five times. He recalled he once assisted someone from CESC in updating their operating system. [redacted] talked to [redacted] Last Name Unknown (LNU) from CESC most times. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not aware of a laptop containing an archive of email belonging to HILLARY CLINTON that was shipped to PRN around February 2014. [redacted] was not aware what became of the foregoing laptop. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not aware of any support PRN provided the CESC client from October 2014 to January 2015. [redacted] was not aware of any CESC request to delete, wipe or shred their email records. [redacted] was not aware of any email content being transmitted to CESC. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) At this point in the interview, Agents displayed PRN provided records and email from the March 2015 timeframe. [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not aware of a trip made by PRN employee [redacted] to the Equinix data center in Secuacus, New Jersey. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) After Agents displayed an email dated March 09, 2015 where CHERYL MILLS discussed preservation of materials, [redacted] had no knowledge of the email or any request by any entity to preserve CESC related data. b6 b7C

Investigation on 05/23/2016 at Denver, Colorado b3 b7E

File # [redacted] 302 - 99 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] has no recollection of a conference call on March 25, 2015 or March 31, 2015 with CESC. [redacted] stated CESC never requested their email content by deleted, wiped or shredded. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was unaware of any PRN employee conducting manual deletions of the DATTO device used to back-up the CESC email server. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was unaware of any successful computer intrusion of the CESC server. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) Notes of the interview and documents displayed to [redacted] will be maintained in a FD340 envelope and filed with the captioned investigation. b6 b7C

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DATE 10-05-2016 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 6/29/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On June 29, 2016 [redacted] Assistant to President William J. Clinton, [redacted] was interviewed telephonically by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents [redacted] Representing [redacted] and also present for the call, was [redacted] from The Department of Justice (DoJ) Counterintelligence and Export Control Section also participated in the call. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not familiar with Tor, which enables anonymous communication, nor did [redacted] ever use Tor. [redacted] described herself as a "very low tech person." b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] used various communication devices and computer to remotely sign into her @presidentclinton.com email account. These devices included an iPhone, BlackBerry, and on rare occasions, a laptop. [redacted] also accessed her @presidentclinton.com email account from her desktop computer at the Clinton Foundation. [redacted] s desktop computer operated off of Windows, but she was not sure of the specific version. [redacted] further stated that she used an Apple Mac on occasion to sign onto her email. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] did not recall experiencing any unusual spam or phishing email activity related to her @presidentclinton.com email account in January, 2013. [redacted] was in New York on January 5, 2013. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) A copy of the original interview notes are attached in a 1A envelope.

Investigation on 6/29/2016 at Washington, D.C. b3 b7E

File # [redacted]-302 ~88 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/21/2015

On September 14, 2015, [redacted] Platte River Networks, date of birth [redacted] b6 b7C
social security number [redacted] was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] Also present for the interview was [redacted] from [redacted] and Department of Justice (DOJ) Attorney [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following:

In February or March 2013, [redacted] was informed by [redacted] b6 b7C
at Platte River Networks (PRN), of a potential contract managing email for a high profile client, but did not know who the client was. [redacted] was not involved in the proposal or technical solution for the client, nor did he have any first hand meetings with anyone representing the client. [redacted] and [redacted] handled those matters. [redacted] eventually learned the client was WILLIAM CLINTON and HILLARY CLINTON (CLINTON), doing business through a company named CESC. At some point during the process, CESC conducted background checks on the individuals who would provide the technical support for the contract. Those individuals were [redacted] and [redacted] did not know why CESC conducted the background checks, but assumed it was because they were a high profile client.

On or about March 2015, [redacted] first learned about concerns regarding CLINTON's use of a b6 b7C
private email server when it was reported by the media. Due to this increased attention, PRN decided to place Internet Protocol (IP) country blocks and took other additional steps to secure the CESC server. In the same timeframe, [redacted] participated in a conference call with CLINTON's counsel, Williams and Connolly, to determine where CLINTON's email was stored. While [redacted] was on the call, [redacted] and [redacted] handled most of the questions. Subsequently, PRN received a preservation letter from the United States Senate and a preservation request from the FBI. PRN brought their own counsel on board to assist with these requests.

After receiving the FBI's preservation request, PRN received a letter from Williams and Connolly instructing them to give the FBI the CESC server used prior to migrating email to PRN acquired equipment. [redacted] traveled to New Jersey and turned over the server to the FBI. [redacted] stated b6 b7C
[redacted] did not power up the server before providing it to the FBI.

The CESC email server architecture also involved a DATTO backup appliance. The DATTO was configured to store backup data locally, however, due to a glitch, DATTO backed up data to their cloud for a period of time. On or about August 24, 2015, DATTO sent PRN a letter stating they would stop

Investigation on 09/14/2015 at Denver, Colorado b3

File # [redacted] 302 -13 Date dictated N/A b7E

By SA [redacted] 10/1/2015 SA [redacted] 10/1/2015 b6 b7C

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backing up to their cloud and preserve what was in their possession. The DATTO has a 60 day purge cycle, therefore, DATTO should have data from 60 days prior to August 24, 2015.

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[redacted] stated [redacted] and [redacted] would have specific details regarding the CESC email server project. [redacted] never heard anyone related to the CESC project discuss the existence of classified information on the server.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/26/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On May 23, 2016, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] at the offices of Platte River Networks (PRN) located at 5700 Washington Street, Denver, Colorado 80216. Also present for the interview was [redacted] and via speaker phone, [redacted] both attorneys at the [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not aware of a laptop containing an archive of email belonging to HILLARY CLINTON that was shipped to PRN around February 2014. [redacted] was not aware what became of the foregoing laptop. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] only recently was made aware of a CLINTON email archive file being transmitted to the Clinton Executive Services Corporation (CESC) around July 2014 and September 2014 by [redacted] was not aware of the request by CESC, or transmittal by [redacted] as it was occurring [redacted] was not aware of what specifically was requested by CESC or exactly how [redacted] fulfilled the request [redacted] never spoke with anyone at CESC. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not aware of any support PRN provided the CESC client from October 2014 to January 2015 [redacted] was not aware of any CESC request to delete, wipe or shred their email records. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) At this point in the interview, Agents displayed PRN provided records and email from the March 2015 timeframe. [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) In March 2015, when various media outlets reported a private email domain and server was used by HILLARY CLINTON, PRN decided to create an internal "share drive" and control access to only the PRN employees working the CESC account. PRN never deleted information pertaining to the CESC client and provided the FBI all records they maintained pertaining to CESC.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In March 2015, [redacted] stated PRN employee [redacted] travelled to the Equinix data center to check the security of the servers and to ensure they were "locked tight." After the media reports, PRN was even more concerned about the security of the server. b6 b7C

Investigation on 05/23/2016 at Denver, Colorado

File # [redacted] 302 - 96 Date dictated N/A b3 b7E

By SA [redacted] SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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(U//~~FOUO~~) After Agents displayed an email dated March 09, 2015 where CHERYL MILLS discussed preservation of materials, [redacted] could not recall any other request by any entity to preserve CESC related data [redacted] received guidance from PRN attorneys and understood CESC client information and records should not be destroyed [redacted] believed the preservation request applied more to CESC records and not necessarily email content. [redacted] believed the preservation request to be a request from the government. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] had no specific recollection of a conference call on March 25, 2015 or March 31, 2015 with CESC [redacted] stated CESC never requested their email content by deleted, wiped or shredded. [redacted] had a memory of a request by CESC to confirm their server back-ups were still working, but could not recall the specific request. [redacted] was aware CESC wanted their email retention policy changed to 60 days. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was unaware of any successful computer intrusion of the CESC server. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) Notes of the interview and documents displayed to [redacted] will be maintained in a FD340 envelope and filed with the captioned investigation. b6 b7C

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/17/2015

On August 17, 2015, KATHERINE M. TURNER, Partner at the law offices of Williams & Connolly LLP, 725 12th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. met at her place of employment with Agents of the FBI to discuss voluntarily turning over six (6) laptop computers in her possession known to contain Top Secret classified information. Also in attendance were [redacted] of the FBI's Office of General Counsel, [redacted], Trial Attorney for the Counterespionage Section at the Department of Justice, [redacted] an attorney with Williams & Connelly LLP, and [redacted] counsel for CHERYL MILLS, from the law offices of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. b6 b7C

Prior arrangements had been made to meet at this time and place to discuss an agreement through which Williams & Connelly would voluntarily turn over to the FBI six (6) laptops computers used by the firm to view email communications from the private server of former Secretary of State HILLARY CLINTON. TURNER acknowledged that these laptops contain Top Secret email communications and attorney/client privileged communications. TURNER sought to turn over the laptops as soon as possible but wished to ensure that privileged communications on the laptops would remain confidential. TURNER declined to provide consent to search the laptops and wished to arrange for secure storage of them in a manner agreeable to both the FBI and the attorneys. The FBI agreed to provide TURNER with a draft letter outlining the proposed conditions of storage as soon as possible.

Contrary to statements made on August 6, 2015, TURNER advised that only five of the six laptops are in the possession of Williams & Connelly, the sixth being in the possession of [redacted], counsel for CHERYL MILLS, former Chief of Staff for CLINTON. [redacted] admitted that the computer in his possession has been connected to the Internet on numerous occasions subsequent to being loaded with the classified email communications of HILLARY CLINTON. This laptop was possessed by CHERYL MILLS but utilized by HEATHER SAMUELSON, an attorney on her staff, to conduct a review of approximately 60,000 emails originally contained on CLINTON's private email server. According to [redacted] SAMUELSON deleted CLINTON's personal emails b6 b7C

Investigation on 08/17/2015 at Washington, D.C. b3 b7E

File # [redacted]-81 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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from the original 60,000 resulting in the 30,490 emails eventually turned over to the FBI. [redacted] claimed the other emails had been deleted from the laptop but was unable to specify whether they had been forensically wiped to an unrecoverable state. b6 b7C

Both [redacted] and TURNER admitted that the emails contained on these laptops had been viewed by attorneys who did not have a security clearance at the time they reviewed the material. TURNER said the emails did not contain classification markers and thus they were not aware that they were classified at the time. b6 b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 10-13-2016 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

Date of transcription 12/11/2015

(U//~~FOUO~~) On December 10, 2015 [redacted] date of birth [redacted] of the Office of the Legal Adviser, Financial Disclosure Division, U.S. Department of State was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] Also present were [redacted] Trial Attorney, Public Integrity Section, U.S. Department of Justice and [redacted] Attorney Adviser, U.S. Department of State. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) In 2009, [redacted] worked as an Ethics Analyst for the U.S. Department of State. She was responsible for reviewing the Financial Disclosure Forms (SF-278) of new and current employees to assess if their investments, or outside income sources, created a conflict of interest with their position at the U.S. Department of State. When [redacted] had questions about the filer's SF-278 she would contact them directly, either telephonically or via email, to clarify the filer's responses. [redacted] would then amend the SF-278 to reflect any corrections or clarifying information provided by the filer. She would then send a copy of the updated SF-278 to the filer for their personal records. Once the SF-278 was finalized an assessment was made on whether the filer's investments, or other financial interests, posed a potential conflict of interest. The assessment was then signed off on by [redacted] supervisor, [redacted] Upon completing the review a physical file containing the SF-278 and supporting documents were maintained for a finite period of time before it was destroyed. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was shown copies of the following documents: b6 b7C

- New Entrant SF-278 submitted by BRYAN PAGLIANO on April 15, 2009
- Email from [redacted] to PAGLIANO dated August 25, 2009, with the subject "Ethics Clearance… (Reply Requested)" b6 b7C
- New Entrant SF-278 submitted by BRYAN PAGLIANO on April 15, 2009, with handwritten updates
- Incumbent SF-278 submitted by PAGLIANO on April 4, 2010

(U//~~FOUO~~) After reviewing the documents, [redacted] confirmed that she had sent the above referenced email to PAGLIANO to clarify some of his responses on his original SF-278. [redacted] provided that the email contained her original message to PAGLIANO and did not appear to have been b6 b7C

Investigation on 12/11/2015 at Washington, D.C. b3 b7E

File # [redacted]-302 - 39 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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altered in any way. [redacted] also confirmed that it was her handwriting on the updated New Entrant SF-278 form and that the handwritten notes reflected additional information provided by PAGLIANO in response to her email. [redacted] could not recall any additional information about her exchange with PAGLIANO, aside from what she had written on the updated SF-278. [redacted] believed that PAGLIANO had provided the updated information to her via email but she no longer had those emails because she purged her emails when she changed positions at the U.S. Department of State. [redacted] further noted that the physical file could not be found and had likely been destroyed.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] reviewed the Incumbent SF-278 form filed by PAGLIANO and noted that she did not conduct the review of that document. [redacted] pointed out the checkmarks on the form and stated that they were not her handwriting. [redacted] did not know who reviewed the form but stated that [redacted] should be able to identify the reviewer based on internal computer records.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) With respect to the Incumbent SF-278 form filed for 2009, [redacted] stated that all income and compensation from 2009 should have been captured in Schedule A. This includes any income in the calendar year, even if it was received prior to his start date with the U.S. Government. [redacted] noted that the only exception to this would be if the income was from another government entity. However, income from a political action committee or another campaign related organization would not qualify as other government employment.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] noted that in 2009 the filer would have been provided with several pages of instructions on how to correctly and accurately complete the form. [redacted] provided an electronic copy of the instructions to the interviewing agents.

(U//~~FOUO~~) A copy of the above referenced documents and the original interview notes are attached in a 1A envelope.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 10-13-2016 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

Date of transcription 09/02/2015

On September 2, 2015, [redacted] a Special Agent with Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Norfolk Virginia, was interviewed at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] was previously an agent with the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). [redacted] left DS in approximately [redacted] spouse, [redacted] was also a prior DS agent who, from 2007-2009, served as an Assistant Shift Leader on former Secretary of State CONDOLEEZZA RICE's and HILLARY CLINTON's protective details. [redacted] served briefly on former Secretary CLINTON's protective detail in 2009. From her own experience, and information obtained through [redacted] and other agents, [redacted] described a "stark difference" between RICE and CLINTON with regard to obedience to security and diplomatic protocols. RICE observed strict adherence to State Department security and diplomatic protocols while CLINTON frequently and "blatantly" disregarded them. For example, it is standard security and diplomatic protocol for the Secretary of State to ride in the armored limousine with the local U.S. ambassador when traveling in countries abroad. It is seen as diplomatic protocol for the Secretary of State to arrive at foreign diplomatic functions with the local ambassador; however, CLINTON refused to do so, instead choosing to be accompanied in the limousine by her Chief of Staff, HUMA ABEDIN. This frequently resulted in complaints by ambassadors who were insulted and embarrassed by this breach of protocol. [redacted] explained that CLINTON's protocol breaches were well known throughout Diplomatic Security and were "abundant." b6 b7C

[redacted] explained that ABEDIN possessed "much more power" over CLINTON's staff and schedule than other former chiefs of staff. [redacted] believed that ABEDIN herself was often responsible for overriding security and diplomatic protocols on behalf of CLINTON. b6 b7C

Investigation on 09/02/2015 at Chesapeake, VA b3 b7E

File # [redacted] - 302 - 4 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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On a trip to Jakarta, Indonesia, in early 2009, CLINTON requested to visit an area of Jakarta that presented security and safety challenges. This visit was reportedly for a photo opportunity regarding CLINTON's "clean cooking stoves" initiative. The DS advance team recommended against traveling to this area because the route could not be secured and was lined with dangerous circumstances and individuals. As such, the DS advance team recommended in writing that this excursion be stricken from the schedule but were told by DS management that it was going to happen because "she wanted it." DS agents felt this excursion into potentially hostile areas placed CLINTON, her staff, the media, and her security detail in unnecessary danger in order to conduct a photo opportunity for "her election campaign." DS agents had the perception that CLINTON was using her position as Secretary of State to campaign for President of the United States. DS agents felt CLINTON traveled with hand-picked media who would present her in favorable light in order to garner political support. It was also believed that CLINTON disregarded security and diplomatic protocols, occasionally without regard for the safety of her staff and protection detail, in order to gain favorable press.

CLINTON traveled in an armored vehicle whose passenger windows do not open. This is a design feature for the protection of the occupants. However, the driver's window does open slightly. On one occasion while traveling to Palestine, CLINTON ordered the limousine driver, believed to be [redacted] to open the window while in "occupied territory", referring to a dangerous area of the West Bank. [redacted] initially declined to respond to CLINTON's request; however, repeated demands by CLINTON forced him to open his window despite the danger to himself and the occupants.

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[redacted] explained that security and diplomatic breaches were often communicated from the foreign post back to the Department of State via cables from the Regional Security Officer (RSO). These cables often described incidents like those described above. [redacted] recommended interviewing current and former RSOs from foreign posts visited by CLINTON during her tenure for more detail into these and similar events.

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Early in CLINTON's tenure as Secretary of State, she and her staff were observed removing lamps and furniture from the State Department which were transported to her residence in Washington, D.C.

[redacted] does not know whether these items were ever returned to the government upon CLINTON's departure from the State Department. b6 b7C

Despite having her own DS security detail, CLINTON continued to utilize a Secret Service security detail while at her residence in Chappaqua, New York. DS security would meet Secret Service security at the airport in New York and turn over protection to them. This practice was unknown to DS prior to CLINTON's tenure and often presented logistical problems to both services. [redacted] explained that CLINTON's treatment of DS agents on her protective detail was so contemptuous that many of them sought reassignment or employment elsewhere. Prior to CLINTON's tenure, being an agent on the Secretary of State's protective detail was seen as an honor and privilege reserved for senior agents. However, by the end of CLINTON's tenure, it was staffed largely with new agents because it was difficult to find senior agents willing to work for her. [redacted] claimed to have had at least one conversation with Secret Service agents who experienced the same poor treatment. b6 b7C

Inside CLINTON's office at the Department of State there is a security checkpoint known as "Post 1." Post 1 is staffed by a uniformed DS officer and a DS agent and provides security to CLINTON's inner office. CLINTON's office is a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) and Post 1 is located within that SCIF. By DS security policy, no cell phones are allowed inside the SCIF and DS agents, officers, and staff are required to leave their cell phones outside the door in secure lockers. CLINTON refused to abide to this security requirement and brought her cell phone, believed to be a Blackberry, inside the SCIF where a DS agent assigned to Post 1 was required to guard it. DS agents were indignant that they were required to follow security policy but CLINTON made herself exempt from the same regulations.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 2/11/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On February 10, 2016 [redacted], DOB [redacted] was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] at the law offices of Latham & Watkins LLP, 885 3rd Ave, New York City, NY. Also present were [redacted] and [redacted] of Latham & Watkins. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] is currently a [redacted] and a [redacted] at [redacted] He was formerly the [redacted] at the Department of Defense (DoD) from [redacted]. Prior to the DoD, [redacted] was at the National Security Council (NSC) from [redacted] until [redacted] During that time he held the positions of [redacted] from [redacted] to the Fall of [redacted] from [redacted] until early [redacted] and then [redacted] b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] provided that there were typically three to five Deputy Committee (DC) meetings a week, up to four Principal Committee (PC) meetings a week, and NSC meetings with the President as needed. Additionally, there was a weekly lunch between Secretary GATES, National Security Advisory DONILON and Secretary CLINTON [redacted] provided that [redacted] the DoS representative for DC meetings and Secretary CLINTON was the DoS representative for PC and NSC meetings. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) While at the NSC, [redacted] was responsible for working with the meeting participants, to include the Department of State (DoS), to coordinate and plan for each upcoming meeting. More specifically, [redacted] would review memorandums, prepare meeting packages and control the flow of information between the agencies. These interactions occurred through both formal and informal channels. [redacted] provided that with respect to DoS matters he primarily worked with JAKE SULLIVAN and JOE MACMANUS. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) Prior to each DC and PC meeting the NSC would notify the participants of the upcoming meeting and ask that they submit their meeting packages in advance so that they could be distributed as read ahead material. [redacted] stated that he routinely worked with SULLIVAN to ensure that DoS agendas, talking points, and formal documents were received in advance of each meeting. [redacted] noted that he would sometime provide relevant documents, such as ODNI assessments, to DoS b6 b7C

Investigation on 2/10/2016 at New York, NY b3 b7E

File # [redacted] 302 - 55 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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for their use as they prepared their meeting packages [redacted] stated that the classification level of the packages was dependent on the content and could be unclassified, classified or a mix. Documents and meeting packages were typically transmitted between agencies via the appropriate email system, secure fax (i.e., Washfax) or courier service.

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) Following each meeting an NSC staffer would take notes and then prepare a Summary of Conclusions (SOC) that summarized the issue discussed, supporting and dissenting opinions, the final outcome and any necessary action items. The SOC would then be approved by the NSC executive staff before being distributed to the meeting participants.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not aware of how or where the NSC archived the SOC and related documents for a specific DC or PC meeting.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was shown several emails that were sent in preparation for an October 2009 PC meeting regarding the U.S. strategy in Pakistan. However, after reviewing the emails [redacted] stated that while he remembered the topic in general he could not recall the specific PC meeting in question. He noted that at that time there were numerous meeting on the subject. Similarly, [redacted] could not recall the details of any of the documents referenced in the emails. While [redacted] could not comment on the specifics of the emails he did note that the emails were representative of the communications that were exchanged between NSC and DoS as they were preparing for a PC meeting.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was shown an email that was sent in preparation for a June 2011 PC meeting. However, [redacted] could not recall any specifics regarding the PC meeting in question given the limited content of the email.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) A copy of the original interview notes and the referenced emails are attached in a 1A envelope.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 10-13-2016 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

Date of transcription 10/26/2015

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 10/23/2015, Special Agent (SA) [redacted], Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DOB [redacted], SSAN [redacted] was interviewed in person by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] in FBI Headquarters. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] began working for Department of State's (DoS) Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) in [redacted] where he was assigned to the DSS Los Angeles Field Office. In [redacted] was selected for an assignment with the Secretary of State's security detail. [redacted] served on the Secretary's detail until [redacted] when he joined the FBI as an SA and attended FBI new agent training. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) When [redacted] began his stint on the Secretary's detail, CONDOLEEZZA RICE, was the Secretary of State. [redacted] detail assignment carried over to HILLARY CLINTON, when she was appointed Secretary of State in 2009. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) DSS covered the majority of CLINTON's protection while she was in the Washington, DC, area. However, when her husband was in town, United States Secret Service (USSS) would cover the bulk of the protection detail responsibilities when she was with her husband or in the residence.

(U//~~FOUO~~) USSS would provide security for CLINTON's 3067 Whitehaven Street NW, Washington, DC, address during the day and DSS would cover the overnight detail. [redacted] was never inside the CLINTON's Whitehaven residence, as DSS usually posted in a vehicle outside. CLINTON had a secure telephone in her Whitehaven residence and [redacted] assumed it was in a secure room. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) CLINTON usually traveled to her home in Chappaqua, NY, via a US Airways shuttle from Reagan National Airport (DCA) to Westchester County Airport in White Plains, NY. USSS would handle CLINTON's security in NY, and DSS would have a small presence to maintain CLINTON's communications. [redacted] was never inside CLINTON's Chappaqua residence. [redacted] was known as the CLINTON's Chappaqua "house guy/scheduler." The security detail would often contact [redacted] to determine the Secretary's departure time. b6 b7C

Investigation on 10/26/2015 at Washington, DC b3 b7E

File # [redacted] 302 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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(U//~~FOUO~~) The Secretary's security detail chain of command was as follows:

1 Special Agent in Charge (SAC)
4 Assistant Special Agents in Charge (ASAC)
3 Shift Leads (SSA)
Approximately 45 SA's assigned directly to detail shifts

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was the SAC during CLINTON's tenure as Secretary. [redacted] and [redacted] were two ASAC's during the same time period. [redacted] was a SSA, and both [redacted] and [redacted] were shift agents assigned with [redacted] to CLINTON's detail. [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted] are all still employed with DSS (possibly in the Washington Field Office).

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(U//~~FOUO~~) CLINTON's office was located on the 7th floor of DoS Headquarters. The entire Secretary's suite was a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). The DSS security detachment maintained a Post directly outside the Secretary's office. The DSS space was known as Post One (1). DSS personnel were not authorized to bring their mobile phones into Post 1, as it was located within the SCIF. CLINTON did keep a mobile phone inside a desk drawer inside Post 1, but when she would remove the phone from the desk, she would take it to a non-SCIF space to make calls or use the phone.

(U//~~FOUO~~) HUMA ABEDIN and CHERYL MILLS were among CLINTON's staff members who had offices located within the 7th floor Secretary's SCIF. In addition to ABEDIN and MILLS, [redacted], and JAKE SULLIVAN, were part of CLINTON's main "traveling crew." MILLS did not accompany CLINTON on many overseas trips.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] could not recall the specifics surrounding the electronic devices used by CLINTON's executive staff, but he assumed they were BlackBerry devices. [redacted] did not interact with CLINTON nor MILLS via email, but sometimes he would receive a forwarded email with their accounts listed in the chain. [redacted] remembered receiving email chains that contained Clintonfoundation.org accounts. [redacted] also thought he recalled seeing emails from [redacted] originating from a Gmail account, however, he was not entirely sure.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) In addition to the Secretary's DSS security detail, CLINTON also traveled with a team of Security Engineers who were specifically assigned to her staff. These Security Engineers would travel overseas with CLINTON for the specific purpose of setting up and maintaining her Communications while on travel. The Security Engineer Team generally set up a secure communication post inside the Embassy, or a hotel room adjacent to where the Secretary would stay. The communication post would be manned 24 hours a day.

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b1 per DOS

(S//~~NF~~) The team of Security Engineers would send the necessary equipment to set up the Secretary's communications via diplomatic pouches [redacted] As it relates to the Secretary's use of Diplomatic Pouches, [redacted] was unaware of the process and procedures related to the preparation and transport for overseas travel.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) When traveling overseas in advance of, or with, the Secretary, the Regional Security Officer (RSO) would usually provide CLINTON's security detail a letter, prior to, or on arrival. The letter provided guidance on what to expect from a security standpoint while in a particular country. [redacted] was not sure if a similar letter from the RSO was provided to the Secretary and/or her executive staff.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) The Secretary's security detail would "hotwash" after an overseas trip, to compare the advance team's preparation to what actually took place during the Secretary's travel. The RSO was not a part of these after action discussions. [redacted] believed an RSO would send a cable to the RSO assigned to the Executive Office at DoS Headquarters if there were any security issues concerning CLINTON and/or her staff.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Agent notes are maintained in a 1A envelope.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/26/2015

[redacted] United States Department of State (STATE), 515 22nd Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037, office telephone (202) [redacted] mobile telephone (202) [redacted] email [redacted]@state.gov, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed on his mobile telephone by FBI Special Agent [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

The Information Programs and Services (IPS), Bureau of Administration oversaw the program for Congressional inquiries and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. The House Select Committee on Benghazi requested emails to or from former Secretary of State Hillary CLINTON related to Benghazi. It was determined there were 296 emails related to the Benghazi request. After IPS officials performed their review of the 296 emails, they referred emails for classification determination to four outside agencies, specifically the: 1) FBI; 2) CIA; 3) Department of Defense (DoD); and 4) National Security Council (NSC).

IPS officials have regular points of contact (POCs) at all agencies and STATE bureaus that the IPS would send classification determination referrals to in response to Congressional or FOIA requests. The regular POCs at the agencies listed above were as follows:

- FBI: [redacted] –no contact information provided.
- CIA: [redacted] –no contact information provided; [redacted] boss was [redacted] the CIA's FOIA branch similar to STATE's IPS team, [redacted] email was [redacted]@ucia.gov.
- DoD [redacted] Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)—no contact information provided.
- NSC: [redacted] retired now, but was the POC earlier in 2015 when the Benghazi request was processed. NSC's current POC was [redacted] telephone 202 [redacted] email [redacted]@nsc.eop.gov. [redacted] believed [redacted] might inform [redacted] and [redacted] Legislative Affairs, if contacted by the FBI.

Before IPS conducted their review of the Benghazi request, [redacted] Attorney, Office of the Legal Adviser performed their own, independent review of the 296 Benghazi-related emails. [redacted] review team used different POCs at other agencies to review the 296 emails for a classification determination. [redacted] did not know why: 1) [redacted] team did a review, as that was

Investigation on 08/26/2015 at Washington, DC

File # [redacted] -79 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted]

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IPS' purview; 2) why [redacted] team used different POCs than the regular POCs IPS used; 3) what review criteria and/or parameters [redacted] team used during their review; and 4) why [redacted] team reviewed and produced the 296 emails to the House Committee prior to IPS conducting their formal review. b6 b7C

[redacted] team used reviewers from the following agencies: 1) Department of Justice (DOJ); 2) CIA; 3) DoD; and 4) White House Counsel (WHC). [redacted] team's POCs were as follows:

- DOJ: [redacted]---telephone 202-[redacted]
- CIA: When asked directly who the CIA reviewer was, [redacted] and her team stated they did coordinate through the CIA but, to date, had not given a name for who their CIA reviewer was. b6 b7C
- DoD: [redacted]---telephone 703-[redacted], email [redacted]@mail.mil.
- WHC: [redacted]---telephone 202-[redacted] email [redacted]@who.eop.gov.

[redacted] did not know why [redacted] team used a POC at the DOJ instead of the FBI and a POC at the WHC instead of the NSC. [redacted] did not want to provide his thoughts on why he thought they used the wrong POCs. [redacted] stated that [redacted] team made a "rookie mistake" when they used the WHC instead of the NSC. b6 b7C

[redacted] summed up the issue with the different POCs as frustrating and again pointed out that IPS referred the 296 emails to the NSC, FBI, CIA and DoD whereas [redacted] team referred the 296 emails to the WHC, DOJ, CIA and DoD, and none of the referents were known to be the same between IPS' team and [redacted] team. b6 b7C

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/24/2015

[redacted], United States Department of State (STATE), 515 22nd Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037, office telephone (202) [redacted] mobile telephone (202) [redacted] email [redacted]@state.gov, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed in person by FBI Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20535. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] started working at STATE in [redacted] and since [redacted] was the [redacted] for Margaret "Peggy" GRAFELD, Deputy Assistant Secretary, who was responsible for overseeing 400-500 employees who work on matters related to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Privacy Act, and information management for STATE. A/GIS was the office that provided guidance, usually through memorandums, that oversaw records compliance for all STATE employees. A/GIS also oversaw the coordination, production and maintenance of STATE's Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM), though A/GIS was not responsible for the FAM's content. [redacted] Joyce BARR, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Administration, was GRAFELD's boss and immediately subordinate to Under Secretary for Management Patrick KENNEDY. b6 b7C

In or around August 2014, [redacted] in Legislative Affairs to work review and production matters related to inquiries from the House Select Committee on Benghazi. [redacted] STATE's Legislative Affairs. It was around that time that [redacted] started to learn about records production and the FOIA process. Around the same time, [redacted] received a telephone call from [redacted] Attorney, Office of the Legal Adviser, who asked [redacted] if there were any CLINTON-related emails in the [redacted] .pst file that [redacted] had from a previous FOIA request. [redacted] answered [redacted] that there were CLINTON-related emails in the [redacted] .pst file. b6 b7C

The Information Programs and Services (IPS), Bureau of Administration oversaw the FOIA program. In or around November or December 2014, in response to a FOIA request, IPS officials were notified they would pick-up 14 banker boxes of emails at former Secretary of State Hillary CLINTON's office related to CLINTON's use of personal email to conduct official STATE business. Later, [redacted] b6 b7C

Investigation on 08/19/2015 at Washington, DC b3 b7E

File # [redacted] Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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[redacted] to pick-up only 12 boxes at Williams & Connolly, LLP. On or around December 4, 2014, [redacted] picked-up 12 boxes at Williams & Connolly. [redacted] and IPS officials were unsure what happened to the other two boxes. The items in the boxes were stacked with no folders or known method of organization. b6 b7C

[redacted] Global Publishing Solutions, who used classified copiers and made two-sided copies of all received materials for [redacted], a copy for officials in STATE Executive Secretariat (S/ES), and a couple of copies for IPS officials to use for their FOIA review. The original emails were shrink-wrapped and placed in a sensitive compartmented information facility in Newington, Virginia. b6 b7C

In March 2015, [redacted] first heard of issues with the CLINTON-related FOIA process. [redacted] the FOIA program. The normal FOIA process would be where IPS received a FOIA request, then IPS forwarded that request on STATE forms via email to the person who the FOIA request pertained to. The pertinent party would then fill out the form and provide the IPS office the requested items, which the IPS office then reviewed prior to a release of the information back to the initial requestor. In the CLINTON-related FOIA case, IPS received an unprecedented amount of emails in hard copy form, as there were 52,455 work-related pages to review. In a letter hand-delivered to KENNEDY by Cheryl MILLS, or MILLS' attorney, it was stated, "in an abundance of caution, they overproduced." b6 b7C

Separate from the CLINTON-related FOIA request, there was a Congressional request for CLINTON-related emails related to the Benghazi incident from the House Select Committee on Benghazi. A review was conducted of 296 emails, probably by persons who worked in the Bureau of Legislative Affairs and Office of the Legal Adviser. [redacted] stated [redacted] and [redacted] would know why and how those 296 specific emails were picked and why and how they conducted their own review, separate from any review the IPS unit conducted. Previously, IPS had always been in charge of Congressional document production; [redacted] stated attorneys from Legislative Affairs and Office of the Legal Adviser would normally only weigh in on the legality and scope of requests, but IPS would actually conduct the review and production. [redacted] and [redacted] stated they coordinated the proper review of the material with STATE bureaus and other agencies. After their own review was finished, [redacted] and [redacted] produced the requested material for the House Committee, prior and independent to the IPS unit's formal review. b6 b7C

[redacted] stated those involved at IPS felt the 7th floor, or leading STATE officials, had their own ideas on how to formally review the 296 emails. KENNEDY's initial idea for how to review the 296 email was as follows: 1) the IPS officials conduct a review; 2) IPS officials referred items to other STATE bureaus and inter-agency partners for their review; 3) IPS officials received the referral determinations and submitted to the House Committee. The review process that was finally decided upon was as follows: 1) the IPS officials conduct a review; 2) IPS officials referred items to other STATE bureaus and inter-agency partners for their review; 3) IPS officials received the referral determinations and submitted b6 b7C

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to the Office of the Legal Adviser; 4) after the Office of the Legal Advisers review, then it would be submitted to the House Committee.

In mid-March 2015, IPS officials conducted their formal review of the 296 emails on their classified network, aka "CLASSNET," using their Freedoms System, aka "F2." IPS felt immense pressure to complete the review quickly and to not label anything as classified. In IPS' initial review, they did not use a B(1) exemption on any of the emails. The B(1) exemption was used to exclude the public release of classified information or matters related to national security. IPS officials were told there was nothing classified in the 296 emails, so they shouldn't use the B(1) exemption.

However, from the formal review of the 296 emails, in total, [redacted] thought there were four or five STATE bureaus, such as African Affairs Bureau and the Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) Bureau, and five non-STATE agencies, specifically the FBI, CIA, Department of Defense, National Security Council and White House Counsel, that were sent referrals (items/emails) to conduct their own formal classification review. The NEA responded that in the material they received there were four or five B(1) redactions that needed to be made. After he heard this, [redacted] was frustrated and asked IPS officials if they were "going to challenge the desk officer from Maghreb" by using the B(1) exemption. [redacted] asked, "Who at NEA upgraded it? We'll need to explain classification to these people." [redacted] stated multiple times [redacted] already coordinated with other agencies and [redacted] has previous experience with document production." [redacted] stated "NEA will change their B(1)s to B(5)s because they (NEA) didn't understand how to classify items." A B(5) exemption was not used for classified data, but rather for privileged communications, such as executive- or attorney-related privileges. [redacted] or [redacted] also stated, "it's not classified until we upgrade it." b6 b7C

The review officials that [redacted] and [redacted] used for the review of the 296 emails were not the same normal review officials that the IPS team use on a regular basis. For example, [redacted] and [redacted] did not use the IPS' normal point of contact for the FBI, [redacted] but instead used someone from the Department of Justice to count as the FBI reviewer. The names [redacted] and [redacted] stated they used for White House Counsel and the Department of Defense were also not the regular reviewers the IPS team used. [redacted] and [redacted] upon being asked directly, would not give a name of who they coordinated reviews with at the CIA. b6 b7C

Throughout the process, [redacted] stated if an email/item should have a B(1) exemption, then IPS would use a B(1) exemption. Despite that, at the end of the referral process, IPS was told to run everything by Legislative Affairs and [redacted] IPS officials felt intimidated when they used or suggested the use of the B(1) exemption on any of the 296 emails. In addition to [redacted] and [redacted] KENNEDY and [redacted] were named as some of the STATE officials who pressured IPS employees to not label anything as classified. b6 b7C

In late April 2015, IPS officials completed the formal review of the Benghazi-related Congressional inquiry. All materials were ready for release at that time. The CIA provided redactions,

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but none were deemed a B(1) exemption. Most of the items with CIA redactions were emails from Sidney BLUMENTHAL. One item was deemed classified according to the FBI and KENNEDY held a closed door meeting attended by the FBI's [redacted] and IPS' [redacted] among others. In that meeting, KENNEDY asked [redacted] to change the FBI's B(1) upgrade classification, but [redacted] did not change the FBI's stance. On May 22, it was decided by the IPS team they would keep the upgrade of the one FBI-related email and the IPS officials sent David KENDALL, Attorney, Williams & Connolly, LLC, a letter informing him of the results.

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There was a powerful group of very high-ranking STATE officials that some referred to as "The 7th Floor Group" or "The Shadow Government." This group met every Wednesday afternoon to discuss the FOIA process, Congressional records, and everything CLINTON-related to FOIA/Congressional inquiries. The known regular attendees included Jonathan FINER, Chief of Staff for Secretary of State John KERRY, Jennifer STOUT, Deputy Chief of Staff, Heather HIGGINBOTTOM, Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources, KENNEDY, Julia FRIFIELD, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, [redacted] Office of the Legal Adviser, [redacted] Office of the Legal Adviser overseeing STATE's [redacted], [redacted] and [redacted].

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Normally, with larger FOIA requests, such as with the CLINTON-related FOIA request, IPS would schedule a rolling release—that meant every few weeks or month, the properly reviewed and approved material would be made public. However, [redacted] and The 7th Floor Group argued the release should be done all at once in January 2016, for coordination purposes. While IPS officials did not have control of the release process of the 296 emails related to the House Select Committee on Benghazi's request, they did have control for the release process for the approximately 30,000 emails, or 52,455 pages related to the CLINTON FOIA request, and it was decided to be a rolling release.

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On July 15, 2015, IPS on-boarded Intelligence Community Inspector General (ICIG) reviewers to help with the overwhelming review process. The ICIG reviewers were trained up and had been integrated into the FOIA review process to help ensure IPS can meet the mandated release of all non-exempt/non-redacted emails by the January 15, 2016 deadline. To date, [redacted] was aware of approximately 305 referrals already sent out for classification determination.

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[redacted] stated S/ES are the Custodian of Records for all Secretaries of State and Deputy Secretaries of State. As such, S/ES received all taskers from the IPS team related to FOIA requests that involve Secretaries of State or Deputy Secretaries of State. S/ES should also have answers regarding STATE's procedures that dealt with information technology, including hardware and software for STATE employees' emails and telephones. Joseph MACMANUS, Executive Secretary and Ambassador, S/ES, and [redacted], S/ES, or someone in the S/ES Information Resource Management (S/ES/IRM) unit should know specific details about CLINTON's at-home server set-up. [redacted] stated STATE servers were located at the Enterprise Server Operations Center (ESOC) and Management/IRM (M/IRM) would be knowledgeable about STATE servers.

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High-ranking STATE officials, described as some Assistant Secretaries and all Under Secretaries and higher, used a separate network for emails and record-keeping called the Principal Officer Electronic Management System (POEMS). The vast majority of STATE employees were not on POEMS.

[redacted] stated he heard third-hand the National Security Agency (NSA) set-up a computer for CLINTON and the FBI should talk to S/ES about the specifics. Additionally, FBI should ask S/ES about Jake SULLIVAN's email being hacked, as maybe that had something to do with CLINTON's emails or why the NSA set-up her computer. b6 b7C

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FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/31/2015

[redacted] of Platte River Networks, 5700 Washington Street, Denver, Colorado, 80216, telephone (303) [redacted], email [redacted]@platteriver.com, was contacted in person by Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted]. After [redacted] was advised of the identity of the agents [redacted] identified himself as [redacted] Platte River Networks and stated that he had contacted the company's legal counsel about the scheduled meeting with the FBI on July 29, 2015. Counsel had advised [redacted] not to answer questions from the FBI without counsel present. b6 b7C

SA [redacted] told [redacted] no interview would be necessary; however, SA [redacted] needed to provide [redacted] a document with instructions for Platte River Networks. [redacted] invited both SAs [redacted] and [redacted] to an empty conference room. b6 b7C

SA [redacted] provided a copy of a FBI preservation letter dated July 27, 2015, signed by Charles H. Kable IV, Section Chief, Counterintelligence Division. [redacted] commented company officials had wondered how long it would take for them to be contacted about the named account. [redacted] asked for clarification about the preservation letter and the responsibilities of their company. SA [redacted] then read to [redacted] a portion of the preservation letter and explained the FBI was not asking for any information at this time, but that the letter was served in anticipation of future legal process. The letter requested that Platte River Networks preserve any records to date which were identified in the aforementioned preservation letter. Agents also explained the request for non-disclosure. b6 b7C

[redacted] expressed his concern about Platte River Networks becoming a target if this matter ever became public. SA [redacted] provided [redacted] with her contact information at FBI Denver. b6 b7C

[redacted] was also provided FBI Strategic Partnership Coordinator (SPC) brochures that have information about Counterintelligence security awareness. Agents also discussed the FBI's Infragard program. b6 b7C

Investigation on 07/29/2015 at Denver, Colorado b3 b7E

File # [redacted] Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/07/2015

On August 6, 2015, KATHERINE M. TURNER, Partner at the law offices of Williams & Connolly LLP, 725 12th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. met at her place of employment with Agents of the FBI pursuant to an agreement reached by correspondence between the Department of Justice and Williams & Connolly. This agreement (enclosed), reached on August 6, 2015, provided that Williams & Connolly voluntarily turn over to the FBI three (3) thumb drives containing 30,490 emails from former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's @clintonemail.com account as well as hard copy printouts of the emails and a laptop computer containing a duplicate electronic copy.

At approximately 2:30PM, TURNER met Agents at the loading dock of her firm and transferred 22 legal boxes of documents to the FBI's possession along with a laptop computer and three (3) thumb drives described in detail below and on the enclosed FD-941, Consent to Search Computers, and FD-597, Receipt for Property.

Item 1: Lenovo Thinkpad T420, S/N PB-YC912 12/03

Item 2: Lexar Micro 16GB thumb drive, black and silver in color, S/N LTDTT16GB-000-1001DA (original)

Item 3: Lexar Micro 8GB thumb drive, green and white in color, S/N LTDTT8GB-000-117AU

Item 4: Kingston 8GB thumb drive, silver in color, S/N DTSE9

Item 5-27: 22 legal boxes containing paper copies of the above described 30,490 email communications

TURNER explained that the original thumb drive, Item 2, was obtained from Platte River Networks but did not describe how it was collected or under what circumstances. TURNER described the other two thumb drives as identical to the original though one of the drives contained two complete copies of the email set. The laptop computer was previously used by the firm for unrelated matters but was believed

Investigation on 08/06/2015 at Washington D.C. b3

File # [redacted] Date dictated N/A b7E

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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to have been cleaned of privileged material prior to use and storage of the 30,490 emails. This laptop has not been connected to the internet since being loaded with an electronic copy of the emails. The user name for the laptop is ".\internetonly" and the password is "1nternet0nly!!".

TURNER explained that the firm maintains six (6) additional laptop computers, each of which contain identical digital copies of the 30,490 emails, but also contain attorney/client privileged communications and as such are not being turned over to the FBI at this time. TURNER advised her firm is in negotiations with the Department of Justice over the disposition of these laptops.

Prior to departing, TURNER signed the enclosed FD-941, Consent to Search Computers, and FD-597, Receipt for Property. The original was kept by the FBI and copies were made by TURNER for her records.

Subsequent to the FBI's collection of the above, Items 1-27 were transported to the Washington Field Office of the FBI where they were entered into evidence, and given 1B numbers. Copies of the intake sheets and FD-1004 are enclosed with this communication. Items 1-4 were then transported by members of the FBI's Forensic Analysis Unit to Quantico, Virginia for storage and evaluation. Items 5-27 are presently stored in evidence control at the Washington Field Office.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/21/2015

(U//~~FOUO~~) On December 18, 2015, [redacted] b6 b7C
[redacted] Executive Secretariat – Information Resource Management Mobile Communications (S/ES - IRM MC), at the U.S. Department of State, email address [redacted]@state.gov, telephone 202[redacted] was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] has worked at the Department of State since [redacted] and has held a variety of IT related positions that include mobile computing, network engineering and developing the State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset (SMART) system. [redacted] b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) The MC team is responsible for establishing secure mobile voice and data communications for the Secretary of State (Secretary) and his team when they are traveling domestically and internationally. Prior to a trip by the Secretary and his team, the MC team assembles kits of networking equipment at their lab in Springfield, VA. The kits include networking components such as switches, routers, encrypters, laptops and VOIP phones and are customized based on threat stream information provided by the local Regional Security Officer. The equipment is then tested to ensure that it is working properly and that it hasn't been compromised before being sealed in a diplomatic pouch and sent to the U.S. diplomatic establishment at their destination. Upon arriving onsite, the team collects the pouch and checks that the seals haven't been tampered with. [redacted] provided that there are nine kits of networking equipment and that multiple kits are deployed when the Secretary is traveling to multiple locations on a single trip. b6 b7C

(C/~~NF~~) [redacted] b1 per DOS

Investigation on 12/18/2015 at Washington, D.C. b3 b7E

File # [redacted]302 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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[redacted] b1 per DOS

(S//~~NF~~) [redacted] b1 per DOS

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) The communication networks established by the MC team provide the Secretary and his staff with secure data and voice connections, so that they can connect back to the Department of State network to securely conduct official business. Although the networks established by the MC team create encrypted data channels, users are still required to use a fob to access their Department of State email accounts. [redacted] noted that the MC team continuously monitors the network encrypters to watch for any signs of an intrusion or other compromise of the system. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] provided that the Secretary and his team typically do not use the SBU network established by the MC team for personal matters. He noted that they are free to use the standard internet service in their own room, as any other hotel guest would. b6 b7C

(S//~~NF~~) [redacted] b1 per DOS

[redacted]

When classified documents, or facsimiles, are sent for the Secretary to review they are usually delivered to the MC team by the local U.S. diplomatic establishment. The MC team then reviews the classification markings and page count before providing the document to the recipient. Once the review is complete the MC team collects the document, counts the pages and then enters the event into a log.

(U//~~FOUO~~) If an urgent message arrives at the mobile command post for the Secretary or his team the MC team will alert the recipient that a message has arrived and that the recipient should return to the command center. Depending on the Secretary's location, this might mean sending a message to one of his Line Assistants or knocking on his door if it is after hours. [redacted] stated that the Secretary does not have a secure cell phone and that he is typically notified to return to the mobile command center even though there are usually secure communications in his car. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] stated that the MC team's policies and procedures are the same for domestic travel as for international travel. However, in the case of domestic travel the communication kits are sent via Diplomatic Security instead of via the local U.S. diplomatic establishment. b6 b7C

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 b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) The MC team is typically staffed by two to four MC team members, depending on the site. All of the MC team members hold a TS/SCI clearance and receive extensive training on the equipment and security procedures before their first deployment. The MC team members are from various components within the Department of State and may be contractors, Foreign Service members, or career civil servants. The average team member is on the team for two or three years before moving on to another assignment within the Department of State. However, [redacted] noted that [redacted] has been on the MC team for approximately [redacted] years. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not in a position to comment on how the MC policies and procedures had changed between 2009 and today but he noted that they are constantly working to apply faster and lighter technologies that will achieve their mission of providing secure and reliable communications. [redacted] had no concerns with the MC team's ability to meet its objectives given the resources that it had. He provided that [redacted] or [redacted] may be able to provide more insight on how the MC team operated between 2009 and 2011. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) A copy of the original interview notes are attached in a 1A envelope.

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DATE 10-12-2016 BY J87J85T94 NSICG

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/17/2016

(U) On June 10, 2016 was interviewed by Special Agent (SA) and SA at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in McLean, Virginia. Also present for the interview was CIA attorney in the After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview provided the following information:

b3 per CIA
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b3 per CIA

b1 per CIA
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b1 per CIA
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Investigation on 06/10/2016 at McLean, VA

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b7E

File # (S, SC) Date dictated N/A

By SA SA

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~~TOP SECRET~~/ [redacted] ~~NF~~ b1 b3

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Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of [redacted], On 09/19/2016, Page 2 b3 per CIA

[redacted] b1 per CIA b3

[redacted] b1 per CIA b3

[redacted] b1 per CIA b3

[redacted] did not have any direct knowledge of ToS officials using unclassified or "barely classified" channels [redacted] but he suspected it [redacted] b1 per CIA b3

[redacted] Intelcrossing agents asked [redacted] to review an email string dated [redacted] and titled [redacted] b1 per CIA b3

[redacted] was asked to review another email dated [redacted] and titled [redacted] After reading the email, [redacted] stated that like the previous email, it did not concern him because the email did not reveal details that would compromise sources and/or methods. b1 per CIA b3

~~TOP SECRET~~/ [redacted] ~~NF~~ b1 b3

~~SECRET~~/[redacted]/NF b1 b3

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

b3 per CIA

Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of [redacted], On 05/10/2016, Page 3

[redacted] reviewed another email dated [redacted] and titled [redacted] After reading the email, [redacted] expressed concerns over the detail contained in the email. [redacted] stated that the email was "very specific," [redacted] however, unclassified email should never have been an option. b1 per CIA b3

[redacted] Agents showed [redacted] another email dated [redacted] and titled [redacted] After reviewing the email, [redacted] stated that he did not have concerns over the email as it was related to [redacted] b1 per CIA b3

[redacted] Agents showed [redacted] one last email dated [redacted] and titled [redacted] After reviewing the email, [redacted] exclaimed [redacted] is an idiot." [redacted] further explained he believed the email was "problematic," [redacted] b1 per CIA b3

[redacted] expressed his opinion that DoS was not very careful [redacted] b1 per CIA b3

(U//~~FOUO~~) A copy of the original interview notes and referenced documents is enclosed in a 1A envelope.

~~SECRET~~/[redacted]/NF b1 b3

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~~TOP SECRET//~~ [redacted] ~~NF~~ b1 b3

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/19/2016

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On May 17, 2016 [redacted] was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in McLean, Virginia. Also present for the interview was [redacted] CIA attorney [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview [redacted] provided the following information: b3 per CIA b6 b7C b3 per CIA

[redacted] b1 per CIA b3

[redacted] b1 per CIA b3

[redacted] b1 per CIA b3

Investigation on 05/17/2016 at McLean, VA b3 b7E

File # [redacted]-TO-SCI Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted] SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~SCI~~

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b3 per CIA

Continuation of FD-302 of ____ Interview of [redacted], On 05/17/2016, Page 2

[redacted]

b1 per CIA
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[redacted]

b1 per CIA
b3

[redacted]

b1 per CIA
b3

[redacted] had no knowledge regarding how State personnel communicated information [redacted] back to State Headquarters (State HQ). However, [redacted] noted the COM had secure communications equipment available. [redacted] had advised State to handle information [redacted] over secure channels, but had concerns the COM would use a non-secure line to call State HQ. [redacted] never directly witnessed this type of communication.

b1 per CIA
b3

[redacted]

[redacted] After reviewing an email dated [redacted] with the subject line [redacted] Had the email been compromised, the damage would have depended on public speculation regarding the meaning of the email.

b1 per CIA
b3

[redacted] After reviewing an [redacted] email with the subject line [redacted] stated the inclusion of a location, name, and time in the email was problematic. He would have insisted such an email be handled in classified channels because [redacted]

b1 per CIA
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[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~SCI~~

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FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95) [redacted] b1 b3

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] Interview of [redacted], On 05/12/2016, Page 3

[redacted] After reviewing an email dated [redacted] with the subject line [redacted] stated the communication would not be as damaging as the [redacted] email. b3 per CIA b1 per CIA b3

[redacted] After reviewing [redacted] email with the subject line [redacted] stated he recalled the situation described in the email [redacted] b1 per CIA b3

(U//FOUO) A copy of the original interview notes and referenced documents is enclosed in a 1A envelope.

[redacted] b1 b3

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FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 6/21/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On June 21, 2016 [redacted] Date of Birth [redacted], was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] at his residence, [redacted] VA. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] worked at the US Department of State (DOS) for approximately [redacted] years before leaving in [redacted] telecommunications specialist under the Executive Secretariat (S/ES) at DOS during HILLARY CLINTON's tenure as the Secretary of State. [redacted] noted that his daily duties remained the same during this period despite several reorganizations which moved his position to different departments. He was responsible for supporting the installation and operation of secure communication equipment at DOS. This included secure video, secure voice, the Washfax, as well as regular telephone and facsimile equipment. [redacted] was not responsible for email support, which was the responsibility of S/ES – Information Resource Management (S/ES–IRM). [redacted] reported to [redacted] who was the [redacted] S/ES-IRM under JOHN BENTEL. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] supported CLINTON's transition to DOS and was responsible for establishing secure communications in her office, vehicles and residences. He initially conducted a survey at each residence to identify where the commercially provided telecom service entered the residence (i.e., the "point of presence") and to assess what equipment needed to be installed. Thereafter, [redacted] connected a T1 circuit and ran lines to the locations in the residences where the equipment would be installed. Although [redacted] installed the equipment it was sometimes maintained by other departments within DOS. For example IRM maintained the Defense Red Switch telephones (i.e., red phones) once they had been installed by [redacted] The point of presence in the Whitehaven residence was in the basement and [redacted] ran lines from there to closet in the third floor SCIF. He then dropped additional lines to the second floor office area so that an additional STE and red phone could be installed. Similarly, the point of presence at the Chappaqua residence was also in the basement and [redacted] ran lines to a small luggage closet and then to the final equipment locations within the residence. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) During the transition [redacted] was also tasked to research the feasibility of obtaining a secure BlackBerry for CLINTON. [redacted] was directed to do this by a combination of the following people: DAN SMITH (Executive Secretary), LEWIS LUKENS (Deputy Assistant Secretary), JOHN BENTEL (S/ES-IRM Director), and the Operations Center Director who was either [redacted] or [redacted] b6 b7C

Investigation on 6/21/2016 at [redacted] VA b6 b7C b3 b7E

File # [redacted] 302 ~ 82 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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[redacted] at the time. DOS wanted to assess the feasibility of using secure BlackBerry phones because CLINTON and her staff were BlackBerry users so DOS wanted to provide them with resources that they were familiar with. However, after conducting his assessment, [redacted] found that the secure BlackBerry phones would require an entirely new infrastructure, which was cost prohibitive; and the actual devices were too thick. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was shown an email with the subject "State Department Telephone Services at Secretary Clinton's Residence" that he sent to LUKENS and ABEDIN on January 27, 2009. The email summarized the telecom equipment that was installed at the Whitehaven residence. After reviewing the email, [redacted] explained that "CMS VoIP" line referred to the direct phone line to the White House and that the "IST/Red Switch" was a red phone that was installed as a backup to the CMS VoIP line. The "Business Lines" and "Ops Dedicated Drop" were standard phone lines. [redacted] stated that not all of the installed equipment belonged to DOS and noted that the CMS VoIP system belonged to the White House. [redacted] said he did this in an effort to give the Secretary the most reliable equipment but this approach caused some strife within DOS. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] from S/ES-IRM, was responsible for installing and managing CLINTON's computer systems at the residences. [redacted] coordinated his installation activities with S/ES-IRM and typically did not conduct his work when they were on site in effort to avoid flooding the residence with people. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was shown an email with the subject "Secretary Residential Installation Hotwash" that he sent to BENTEL, [redacted] and [redacted] on March 17, 2009. [redacted] explained that a hotwash was conducted to develop a solution for any technical problems they had or complaints that they received. [redacted] stated that they had significant issues with the unclassified telephone lines at the residence in Chappaqua. He attributed this to the number of service providers that a direct line traversed as it connected Washington and Chappaqua. As a result the lines consistently had bad connections. Additionally, the red phone on the second floor in Chappaqua did not function properly and eventually CLINTON directly asked [redacted] to remove the phone. [redacted] stated that he removed the phone but it created some internal issues for him as the phone was maintained by IRM and not [redacted] group. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] stated that the "Server: Basement Telephone Closet," as listed in the attachment to the aforementioned "Secretary Residential Installation Hotwash" email, referred to the point of presence for the telephone system in Chappaqua and was not a reference to a computer server. [redacted] was aware that there was an email server in the Chappaqua residence. However, he believed it was for the CLINTON's family email and he did not realize that CLINTON was using the server for DOS business. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] could not recall when he first learned that CLINTON was using a private email account but stated that it was sometime during her tenure. He did not think that CLINTON's use of a private email account was odd because COLIN POWELL had a private email account that he accessed from DOS. [redacted] also assumed CLINTON had a DOS issued account. [redacted] did not communicate directly b6 b7C

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

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Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of [redacted], On 6/21/2016, Page 3

with CLINTON on email and instead worked through HUMA ABEDIN when necessary [redacted] did not recall anybody ever expressing concern over CLINTON's server or email, but noted that he did not attend the S/ES-IRM meetings were such topics would likely have be discussed. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) A copy of the original interview notes and referenced documents are attached in a 1A envelope.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 5/16/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On May 12, 2016, [redacted], was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] in room 374 at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, 1650 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20502. Also present was [redacted] counsel, [redacted], attorney at [redacted] and Department of Justice attorney [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, and the purpose of the interview [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] is currently employed as the [redacted] at the National Security Council. [redacted] has held a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) clearance since 2003 when he was originally sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). [redacted] is not, nor has he ever been, an Original Classification Authority (OCA). In early [redacted] began a fellowship at the Department of State (DOS) in the South Asia Bureau. After moving to the Iran desk for a few weeks in [redacted] began working as [redacted] for the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP). While at the SRAP office [redacted] worked for PAUL JONES, FRANK RUGGIERO, MARC GROSSMAN and RICHARD HOLBROOKE. [redacted] remained working for the SRAP until [redacted] when he moved to [redacted] at DOS. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) While he worked at the DOS, [redacted] was unaware of how information flowed to Secretary of State HILLARY CLINTON. [redacted] was generally aware that the Executive Secretariat at the DOS was responsible for information flow to the Secretary of State. [redacted] could not say who communicated or emailed with CLINTON. [redacted] did not email or communicate with CLINTON directly and did not know that CLINTON had a private email address hosted on a private server until he was made aware via various media outlets in March 2015. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was assigned official DOS email accounts on both an unclassified network and the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet). [redacted] did not have a Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) email account that he could access in his office, but was aware that he was issued one by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) at the DOS. [redacted] indicated he rarely used his JWICS account because his work did not necessitate it and it was hard to access. [redacted] could not recall any specific DOS training pertaining to official email usage guidelines, policies or practices. [redacted] stated "obviously classified information goes on classified systems." b6 b7C

Investigation on 5/12/2016 at Washington, D.C. b3 b7E

File # [redacted] 302 ~85 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] stated Principal's Committee (PC) meetings were initiated by the National Security Advisor via official notice to government agencies. The PC meetings would involve participating government agencies presenting their policy on topics prescribed by the National Security Advisor. A Deputy's Committee (DC) meeting would involve the same process although convened by the Deputy National Security Advisor. During [redacted] tenure at the DOS, he recalled weekly DC meetings related to Afghanistan and Pakistan issues. While in the SRAP office, [redacted] would contribute to packages assembled for DC and PC meetings. Usually, the Deputy SRAP would assign various taskings for a policy paper to be used in a DC or PC. Within the SRAP office, [redacted] stated there was no science as it related to who was assigned work. The assignments could be based on your area of expertise or who you knew within DOS. [redacted] was unaware of any formal process when collaborating, drafting, editing or publishing a written product with another bureau or office at the DOS.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was unaware of the term "upclass" as it referred to the classification of a written product. [redacted] did not know how classification of a written product was ultimately decided. [redacted] recalled seeing written product with suggested classification markings and he would always adhere to those by appropriately marking the same information carried over to his products or edits. [redacted] stated portion markings at the DOS were uncommon before WikiLeaks released classified DOS cables on their website [redacted] understood the classification process to "happen organically" and to be "more of an art than a science."

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(U//~~FOUO~~) At this point in the interview, Agents displayed documents and emails concerning a October 5, 2009 PC meeting involving the DOS. [redacted] provided the following information:

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] recalled the general topic of the October 5, 2009 PC meeting, but did not recall the exact meeting or any of the displayed documents. [redacted] stated there were many PC and DC meetings regarding Pakistan and Afghanistan policy in 2009. [redacted] did not recall drafting or editing any portion of the briefing paper or the attachments. [redacted] could not recall who drafted any of the briefing paper or the attachments. When shown metadata indicating [redacted] drafted the attachments associated with the foregoing briefing paper, [redacted] stated the metadata inferred he interacted with the attachments, or possibly saved them at one point, but [redacted] did not recall doing so.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] described the [redacted] report as the result of a review of Afghanistan and Pakistan policy requested by General STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL. The report resulted in a request for a troop surge in the area. [redacted] recalled there being a classified version of the [redacted] report released and then shortly after, an unclassified version released. [redacted] believed it was standard practice to have both classified and unclassified versions of a document released around the same time. [redacted] described the report as relevant one day, and then shortly after, irrelevant. During his tenure at the SRAP, [redacted] could not recall ever reading the [redacted] report.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] recalled having no concerns over classification or mishandling of documents while at the DOS.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Notes of the interview and the documents displayed for [redacted] will be maintained in an FD340 envelope and filed with the captioned investigation. b6 b7C

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 2/1/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On January 29, 2016, [redacted], date of birth [redacted] was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] at Starbucks Cafe, 370 7th Ave, New York, NY 10001. Representing [redacted] and also present for the interview, was [redacted], Attorney at Law, telephone (202) [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] joined the Department of State (DoS) in [redacted] as a Special Assistant for [redacted] Thereafter she became the [redacted] under JAKE SULLIVAN. [redacted] left the DoS in [redacted] to work for the [redacted] b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] provided that as a Special Assistant at DoS she was a political appointee. Upon starting at DoS she was sworn in and then received the standard on-boarding and security trainings. However, [redacted] could not recall any specific training about the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or the Federal Records Act. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] never traveled with CLINTON and had no knowledge of her iPad or other devices that she used. [redacted] did not have direct contact with CLINTON while she was at DoS and did not email directly with her until after she had left DoS. [redacted] knew that CLINTON was using a personal email account but did not know that it was a potential issue until she read about it in the press. [redacted] was unaware of an official policy at DoS regarding the use of personal email accounts and recalled that other people on CLINTON's staff would use their personal emails periodically. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] held a TS/SCI clearance while at DoS and received training on the handling of classified information. [redacted] routinely handled classified information on the ClassNet system but did not know how such information was transferred from SULLIVAN or [redacted] to CLINTON. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) ZFS is a Limited Liability Corporation (LLC) that was established for the Office of Hillary Rodham Clinton, by [redacted] b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) When [redacted] originally joined the [redacted] it was based in Washington, D.C. at [redacted] The office then moved to New York City in [redacted] b6 b7C

Investigation on 2/1/2016 at New York City, NY b3 b7E

File # [redacted] 302 -52 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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[redacted] everybody had to work from home until [redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was originally an [redacted] at the [redacted] and was primarily responsible for arranging phone calls, drafting memos and summarizing news articles. She was later promoted to the [redacted] provided the names and positions of the following individuals who [redacted] during that time period:

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- HUMA ABEDIN – Chief of Staff
- MONICA HANLEY – Personal Assistant
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] provided that Platte River Networks (PRN) provided IT support to the [redacted] frequently spoke with [redacted], from PRN, about routine matters such as purchasing laptops and maintaining the IT systems.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] had no recollection of ever receiving a laptop from PRN or [redacted] spoke with HANLEY regarding this matter approximately one month ago and then reviewed her email records to see if she had any further information about the laptop. [redacted] found one email between her and HANLEY in which they discussed sending the laptop to PRN. However, the discussion transitioned from email to phone and [redacted] had no further recollection on what occurred. [redacted] noted that this occurred during the period when everybody was working from home due to the aforementioned lease issue. Therefore, if the laptop was shipped to her she would have had it sent to her apartment. She further noted that [redacted] was responsible for opening the mail for the office but that he would not have opened anything directed to her [redacted] speculated that perhaps it was shipped to the Clinton Foundation in New York City but she did not know what they would have done with it.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] had no recollection of CLINTON's emails being turned over to DoS. Nor was she involved in the culling of CLINTON's emails [redacted] had no knowledge of any archives of CLINTON's emails aside from the laptop in question.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Following the interview, [redacted] agreed to provide the above referenced email chain with PRN to the FBI. On February 3, 2016 [redacted] counsel electronically provided the email to SA [redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) A copy of the original interview notes and the email provided by [redacted] are attached in a 1A envelope.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/10/2015

[redacted] to the Inspector General, United States Department of State, Office of Inspector General (STATE IG), 2121 Virginia Avenue, NW, Suite 8100, SA-3, Washington, DC 20037, telephone (202) [redacted] email [redacted]@state.gov was interviewed in person by FBI Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

In early March 2015, the New York Times published an article about Secretary Clinton's personal email account while at the Department of State. The article alleged Secretary Clinton used a personal email account to conduct official government business in violation of federal laws. Sometime thereafter, John KERRY, Secretary of State, sent STATE IG a letter requesting a review of email and records management at the Department of State. On or about March 12, 2015, STATE IG and Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (ICIG) received letters from Congress requesting a review of State Department employees' use of personal email for official purposes and coordination with relevant agencies to determine whether classified information was transmitted or received by State Department employees over personal systems.

STATE IG initiated a review of the use of personal communications hardware and software by five Secretaries of State and their immediate staffs. The review went as far back as former Secretary Madeleine ALBRIGHT. In Fall 2014, the Department of State wrote to the last four Secretaries of State asking whether they had any official email in their personal records. The Department of State issued preservation requests, asking each former Secretary to preserve all electronic data they had while at the Department of State. Secretary Colin POWELL responded that he used an America on Line (AOL) account. Secretary ALBRIGHT reported that she did not have personal accounts with official records. Secretary Condoleezza RICE reported having a Gmail account, which she did not use for official purposes.

In response to the preservation request, Secretary Clinton's attorney, David KENDALL wrote a letter to STATE IG stating Williams & Connolly, LLP was in possession of three thumb drives with Secretary Clinton's email from her private network. KENDALL and Katherine TURNER were the only people at the firm with access to the thumb drives. The letter further stated Platte River Networks was in possession of the server and had been made aware of the preservation request.

Investigation on 08/07/2015 at Washington, DC

File # [redacted] Date dictated N/A b3 b7E

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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[redacted] 8/10/15

Serial 29

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In December 2014, Williams & Connolly, LLP produced twelve boxes, approximately fifty five thousand pages of about thirty thousand emails to the Department of State from Secretary Clinton's private server. There is a court order in place, which requires all thirty thousand emails to be released by January 30, 2016. The emails have to be released on a monthly basis. The emails are released based on select percentages. Thus far, two waves of Secretary Clinton's emails have been released on the FOIA website. Department of State had about fifty to sixty people working on Secretary Clinton's emails for the FOIA review process.

Upon receipt of the emails, they were scanned, entered to the OCR process and then uploaded to Department's of State ClassNet system, which was classified up to SECRET. The emails were then divided into sub-groups. Then each email went through the FOIA process to determine the appropriate FOIA exemptions, if any. Ultimately, the emails were publicly released. Initially, senior State Department officials were being used to review the emails. The officials would review the email, identify which State Department equity worked on the information, and would then send the email to that department. The receiving department would then identify certain exemptions and/or send to other agencies, if other agency equities were involved. The emails would come back to Department of State for further review and were ultimately reviewed on the FOIA website. The B (1) exemption was used to protect sensitive Department of State equities. B (5) exemptions were used to redact internal deliberations. B (6) exemptions were used to redact Personally Identifiable Information (PII).

STATE IG brought in ICIG to assist with the identification of classified information and to take a look at the FOIA review process. [redacted] from ICIG reviewed Department of STATE's FOIA review process. [redacted] brought broader experience to Department of State's assembly line review process. [redacted] quickly determined Department of State needed to make some changes to their review process. On or about June 19, 2015 STATE IG and ICIG jointly made four recommendations to the State Department related to the FOIA review process. The recommendations were as follows:

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1. Recommend State Department FOIA office request staff support from IC FOIA offices to assist in the identification of intelligence community equities;
2. Recommend IC FOIA officers review the emails to ensure that ClassNet use is appropriate before transmitting to the State Bureaus for review;
3. Recommend State Department FOIA seek classification expertise from the interagency to act as a final arbiter if there is a question regarding potentially classified materials; and
4. Recommend State Department FOIA Office incorporate the Department of Justice into the FOIA process to ensure the legal sufficiency review of the FOIA exemptions and redactions.

Patrick KENNEDY, Under Secretary for Management, U.S. Department of State was a key figure in all of this. KENNEDY accepted FOIA recommendations number one and three on behalf of the Department of State. During a July 2015 meeting with STATE IG and KENNEDY, KENNEDY said something to the effect "We sent our folks from Diplomatic Security (DS) to conduct a security

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assessment of Williams & Connolly". DS concluded Williams & Connolly had procedures in place to secure the three thumb drives. KENNEDY mentioned Williams & Connolly handled the General Petreaus investigation, so they had the appropriate clearances and were safe. STATE IG left that meeting with the impression that Department of State had an electronic copy of Secretary Clinton's emails. Later, STATE IG was told that Department of State did not have an electronic copy. STATE IG still would like to obtain an electronic copy of the thumb drives.

STATE IG's review focused on the following areas:

1) Preservation of Records
 a. Are records being preserved for archival purposes?
 b. Are appropriate systems in place for Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) purposes?
 c. Are records being kept in line with the Federal Records Act?
2) On-Boarding Process
 a. How are methods of communications established for new Secretaries?
 b. Each Secretary may like various devices, how does Department of State make those devices secure for usage at Department of State?
 c. How had Department of State addressed security issues?
 d. How did State Department set up secure phone line at Secretary Clinton's house?
 e. What precautions were in place for personal devices?
3) Records Creation Designation
 a. How does State Department make sure draft documents get captured in Department of State's records retrieval process?
4) How has Department of State handled FOIA and the Congressional Process?

[redacted] opined Department of State's record keeping process was not good. Prior to the last couple of years, record keeping was done on a print and file basis. Literally, if someone wanted something to be kept as an official file, that person would have to print the document and request another person file it away. STATE IG was in the process of taking a deep dive into the on-boarding process of Secretary Clinton's server. b6 b7C

Secretary Clinton preferred to use Blackberries. In fact, she had at least two email accounts that went directly to her blackberry account. [redacted] was not sure whether Secretary Clinton had an Information Technology (IT) infrastructure from her time in the U.S. Senate or her presidential campaign. Bryan PAGLIANO worked in IT support for Secretary Clinton's campaign. Shortly after Secretary Clinton started her tenure at Department of State, PAGLIANO was hired as a Schedule C, directly reporting to Secretary Clinton. PAGLIANO set up Secretary Clinton's personal server and provided her direct IT support. PAGLIANO left the Department of State sometime in 2013 and came back in early 2015 as a contractor. STATE IG contacted PAGLIANO as part of STATE IG's ongoing review. STATE IG was informed PAGLIANO was represented by attorneys from Akin Gump Straus Hauer & Feld, LLP. b6 b7C

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PAGLIANO refused to talk without being granted immunity from prosecution.

Secretary Clinton had at least two AT&T blackberry accounts. The first account was the HR15 email account. In September 2013, there was an article about Sydney BLUMENTHAL having his email account hacked. Apparently Secretary Clinton's HR15 account was cited in that article. As a result, Secretary Clinton changed her email to HRD14.

[redacted] believed that Secretary Clinton's server at some point was held at her Chappaqua residence. Department of State would send an advance team to set up Secretary Clinton's communications wherever she needed. [redacted] did not know who paid for the server. Huma ABEDIN and Cheryl MILLS were the conduits for contacting Secretary Clinton. Only a few people at the Department of State were able to contact Secretary Clinton directly.

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As part of STATE IG's ongoing review [redacted]

b5 per DOS

1) [redacted]
2)
3)

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[redacted] recommended the FBI talk to PAGLIANO, [redacted] and [redacted] who were all Department of State employees. [redacted] was willing to provide the FBI with assistance as necessary.

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DATE 10-12-2016 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 6/3/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On June 3, 2016, Department of State (DoS) [redacted] was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] in his office located at [redacted] Virginia. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was the [redacted] from [redacted] to [redacted] to include during the tenure of former Secretary of State CONDOLEEZZA RICE, COLIN POWELL, and HILLARY R. CLINTON at DoS. [redacted] most recently reported to [redacted] b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (IT) Operations for DoS. This included, but was not limited to, software applications, hardware, telecommunications, email. [redacted] DoS Information Resource Management (IRM). b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] provided IT briefings to CLINTON's transition team upon their arrival, however, the DoS executive office did not fall under [redacted] responsibility. JOHN BENTEL, who oversaw Executive Secretariat Information Resource Management (S/ES- IRM), would have been [redacted] in regards to managing IT programs for executive management. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) Around the time of CLINTON's onboard transition, PATRICK KENNEDY, Under Secretary of State for Management, suggested [redacted] interview BRYAN PAGLIANO, who served on CLINTON's 2012 Presidential Campaign. [redacted] and [redacted] interviewed PAGLIANO, who had a MBA from the University of Maryland. After interviewing PAGLIANO, [redacted] agreed he would be a good fit for [redacted] team. PAGLIANO was subsequently hired on to DoS in a Schedule C position, and was tasked with assisting mainly with cost recovery planning and researching DoS technical enhancement opportunities. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not aware PAGLIANO had a secondary role of providing technical assistance to CLINTON. Although [redacted] was aware PAGLIANO came from CLINTON's campaign, he noted PAGLIANO did not have any overtly apparent ties to the 7th floor [a reference to where CLINTON's executive suite was located at DoS]. [redacted] only recalled one incident wherein [redacted] was dealing with a matter that needed input from the 7th floor, and PAGLIANO mentioned he occasionally had contact with individuals on the 7th floor. PAGLIANO b6 b7C

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offered to reach out to his 7th floor contacts, but [redacted] dismissed the offer and proceeded through regular channels. As a Schedule C hire, PAGLIANO would have been required to report any additional income he received from side work with CLINTON. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not aware of, nor did he have any discussions with PAGLIANO concerning CLINTON's use of a private email account or email server. [redacted] did not have direct correspondence with CLINTON, and learned of her use of a private email server when he read about it in the *New York Times*. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) It was [redacted] understanding that DoS policy "discourages" the use of private email, but does not prohibit it. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not aware of the specific IT setup in either CLINTON's office or her residences. However, he believed both of CLINTON's residences had a DoS Secure Fax. [redacted] and/or [redacted] may have had knowledge of her office setup. [redacted] was assigned to the "help desk," and [redacted] worked for [redacted] but later went to work on the 7th floor. [redacted] also assessed [redacted] and [redacted] may also have more insight as to what DoS IT equipment was installed at both of CLINTON's residences. [redacted] was an IRM technician who would know who installed DoS equipment at the Secretary's homes. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) The State Messaging and Archival Retrieval Toolset (SMART) records management system was implemented by IRM as a result of recommendations from a DoS Executive Steering Committee. SMART replaced DoS's telegraph system, and was developed to automate / streamline the process for archiving records. [redacted] was involved in discussions about the development and rollout of SMART, as were representatives from SES. Representatives from the Executive Secretariat asked to be the last to receive the SMART rollout. However, ultimately SMART was never rolled out to the Executive Secretariat. [redacted] could not recall exactly when SMART was implemented at DoS, however, he assessed SMART was rolled out sometime in 2007 - 2008. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) A copy of the original interview notes are attached in a 1A envelope.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 5/11/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On May 10, 2016, [redacted] DOB [redacted], telephone 20[redacted] SSAN [redacted] was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] at his residence [redacted] MD. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] served as [redacted] at the Department of State (DoS) from the beginning of KERRY's tenure to [redacted] Prior to joining DoS, [redacted] served as [redacted] when KERRY was the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) A lot of information would flow through [redacted] en route to KERRY, to include information concerning Congressional Oversight. [redacted] was tangentially involved in the process of production of DoS records to the Benghazi Committee, in that KERRY asked [redacted] to ensure the Committee did not face any DoS roadblocks in response to the request. Furthermore [redacted] wanted to make certain DoS was as comprehensive as possible in their response to the Committee's request. [redacted] was primarily concerned with KERRY being questioned by the Committee over the totality of the production, and thus wanted to cover every production avenue possible to avoid KERRY being blindsided if called to testify to the Committee. The production of documents related to Benghazi began in the spring (April/May) of 2013 and continued as a "rolling production." b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not aware former Secretary of State HILLARY R. CLINTON was using a private email account until 2013, when he recalled hearing news of her email account potentially being compromised as a result of a hack into Sidney Blumenthal's email account. [redacted] advised KERRY to use a government email account when he became Secretary of State, despite what previous Secretary's may have chosen to do. [redacted] was not aware until recently that CLINTON's private email account was maintained on a private server. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] recalled seeing Benghazi production documents containing CLINTON's personal email beginning in early 2014 [redacted] did not recall having any concerns after seeing that CLINTON used a personal email account, as he was aware other Secretary's of State had done the same. b6 b7C

Investigation on 5/10/2016 at Washington, D.C. b3 b7E

File # [redacted] 302 - 72 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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(U//~~FOUO~~) In August or September of 2014 [redacted] went to Capitol Hill to meet with the staff members of the Benghazi Committee, in preparation for a pending hearing with KERRY. [redacted] recalled the topic of issue in his meeting with the committee staff surrounded inquiries regarding the preservation of records. Following his meeting with the committee staff, [redacted] contacted CHERYL MILLS to advise of possible leaks from the committee referencing their production concerns related to CLINTON's email. [redacted] recalled at least one phone conversation with MILLS concerning the matter. [redacted] also spoke with [redacted] from a Public Affairs perspective. [redacted] also had some visibility in the matter, as [redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) In approximately December of 2014, [redacted] recalled a large number of printed CLINTON emails being dropped off at DoS. [redacted] was surprised at the volume of emails produced, and believed the production to be close to 50,000 pages. Two attorneys from [redacted] Last Name Unknown (LNU) and [redacted] LNU [believed to be a reference to [redacted] and [redacted], were brought onto DoS to help process and coordinate the redactions in regards to Benghazi FOIA production. [redacted] described [redacted] as someone who would be "encyclopedic" concerning the process of production regarding Benghazi, to include the production of CLINTON's email. DoS [redacted] was also involved with the DoS production and review process as it pertained to CLINTON's emails and Benghazi as a whole. PATRICK KENNEDY, DoS Under Secretary for Management, also had insight into the production process.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) During the course of the Benghazi production, DoS recognized there was a gap in records related to emails pertaining to not only CLINTON, but other former Secretaries of State who did not use DoS email accounts. As such, Executive Secretary JOSEPH McMANUS drafted a letter in October 2014, requesting former Secretaries produce any personal emails responsive to the Federal Records Act in attempt to retroactively address the gap in DoS records.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was not involved with the discussions or the process concerning how the email production was conducted. [redacted] did not provide direction on how the emails should be produced, nor did he have any knowledge of what methodology was used in determining what emails were responsive to production requests. [redacted] was unaware of any concerns that the original production of emails provided by CLINTON was not entirely comprehensive in response to the request, nor was he aware of any concerns that the email production might contain classified material.

(U//~~FOUO~~) A copy of the original interview notes are attached in a 1A envelope.

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J37J85T94
ON 10-12-2016

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/23/2015 b3 per ODNI b6 per FBI b7C per FBI

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, Patriot Park, 12290 Sunrise Valley Drive, Reston, Virginia 20191. Also present during the interview were [redacted] and [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

(U) (~~S//NF~~) [redacted] had worked as an Inspector in the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC/IG) for approximately 2 years. In May 2015, IG/IC began to assist in the Department of State's Inspector General's (STATE/IG) review entitled "Use of Personal Communications Hardware and Software by Five Secretaries of State and Their Immediate Staffs." This assistance was requested pursuant to the March 12, 2015 letter from the United States Senate. b3 per ODNI b6 per FBI b7C per FBI

(U) (~~S//NF~~) On or about May 28, 2015, [redacted] met with [redacted] the Inspector General, United States Department of State (STATE) and other STATE employees in order to assist in completing the review. It appeared that STATE Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) employees were at least already 6 weeks into the review process. [redacted] immediately recognized problems that impeded STATE's review process. Some of the problems were 1) STATE's computer software was at least 2 generations behind; 2) the optical character recognition (OCR) was faulty; and 3) STATE employees used initials to describe organizations, as opposed to using intelligence designations. [redacted] found STATE FOIA employees very helpful. On various occasions many of the FOIA officials stayed after midnight to conduct the email review. b3 per ODNI b6 per FBI b7C per FBI

(U) (~~S//NF~~) On or about May 22, 2015, STATE publicly released two hundred ninety-six e-mails belonging to former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton (CLINTON). The two hundred ninety-six e-mails were previously reviewed and released by STATE FOIA officials in response to previous FOIA requests. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and National Geospatial Intelligence Agency officials, at least one of those un-redacted e-mails should have been treated as

Investigation on 07/23/2015 at Reston, Virginia b3 b7E

File # [redacted] Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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Classified By: F93M27K51
Derived From: ~~FBI~~ NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20401231

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

b3 per ODNI
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

classified. On or about June 25, 2015 the IC/IG notified the Director of National Intelligence and members of the senate of this leak of classified information.

(U) (~~S//NF~~) IC/IG believed that the release of the two hundred ninety-six e-mails did not comply with FOIA regulations. In fact, public figures were completely redacted from the TO, FROM and CC lines, in violation of FOIA regulations. It also appeared that no STATE FOIA personnel knew how the two hundred ninety-six e-mails had been selected to be released. STATE FOIA personnel indicated during the FOIA review process, some B1 (Classified National Security Information) were removed and changed to B5 FOIA exemptions (Privileged Communications). [redacted] believed STATE FOIA redactions of classified information were inappropriately designated or changed.

b3 per ODNI
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

(U) (~~S//NF~~) The two hundred ninety-six emails were taken from approximately fifty-five thousand pages of thirty thousand e-mails provided to STATE by the Law Offices of Williams & Connolly LLP, (William & Connolly) CLINTON's personal counsel. According to Williams & Connolly, the firm had provided all of CLINTON's work related or potentially work related e-mails from her @clintonemail.com account. Williams & Connolly also maintained a copy of the .PST file containing the electronic copy of the above referenced e-mails, on a thumb drive, stored in a secure safe at Williams & Connolly's Washington, DC office. David Kendall (KENDALL) and Katherine Turner, Esq. (TURNER) were the only two people that had access to the thumb drive. The firm further advised they believed the server equipment used to host CLINTON's @clintonemail.com account was no longer valid or active. Platte River Networks in Colorado maintained custody of the equipment and had received preservation notices.

(U) (~~S//NF~~) IC/IG had considered serving legal process to Williams & Connolly in order to retrieve the thumb drive. Diplomatic Security had attempted to retrieve the thumb drive from William & Connolly, but were informed that since the firm had received preservation letters for the .PST files, the firm could not release the thumb drive to Diplomatic Security. According to [redacted] Diplomatic Security was led to believe Williams & Connolly in fact had 3 copies of the thumb drive.

b3 per ODNI
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

(U) (~~S//NF~~) In December 2014, Williams & Connolly informed STATE they had fourteen boxes containing the approximately thirty thousand e-mails. However, when STATE officials arrived to pick up the boxes, STATE only received twelve boxes. IC/IG had no information as to whether Williams & Connolly were authorized to store classified information or if KENDALL and TURNER held security clearances.

b3 per ODNI
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

(U) (~~S//NF~~) [redacted] surmised [redacted] and other STATE FOIA officials were suspicious of the special appointments to STATE Legislative Affairs of attorneys [redacted] and [redacted] and other STATE FOIA personnel believed the involvement of [redacted] and [redacted] in the FOIA review process was abnormal. [redacted] and [redacted] made recommendations and requested additional changes that were not routine. [redacted] and [redacted] both previously had worked at [redacted] which appeared to create a conflict of interest.

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

b3 per ODNI
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

[redacted] believed both attorneys had also worked at the [redacted] and was possibly involved in the Lois Lerner, Internal Revenue Service situation.

b3 per ODNI
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

(U//~~FOUO~~) On or about June 15, 2015 IC/IG sent a letter to STATE/IG documenting potential issues identified in the Preliminary Review of the State Department FOIA Process. The recommendations were:

1. Recommend State Department FOIA office request staff support from IC FOIA offices to assist in the identification of intelligence community equities;
2. Recommend IC FOIA officers review the email to ensure that ClassNet use is appropriate before transmitting to the State Bureaus for review;
3. Recommend State Department FOIA seek classification expertise from the interagency to act as a final arbiter if there is a question regarding potentially classified materials;
4. Recommend State Department FOIA Office incorporate the Department of Justice into the FOIA process to ensure the legal sufficiency review of the FOIA exemptions and redactions;

b3 per ODNI
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

(U//~~S//NF~~) On or about June 26-27, 2015, a review of the thirty thousand e-mails revealed five additional classified e-mails. [redacted] used key word searches in order to review the e-mail. It appeared that one in every five e-mail addresses were not a .GOV e-mail address. In the thirty thousand e-mails there were about seventeen unsigned classification upgrade memorandums. These memorandums were packages of information which were being held for the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration's signature.

(U//~~S//NF~~) On or about July 1, 2015, IC/IG officials met with Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary of State for Management and other STATE representatives. IC/IG informed STATE that IC/IG would assist STATE/IG conduct the review, whether or not STATE welcomed IC/IG's input. [redacted] alleged STATE made several misrepresentations during this meeting. One such statement made by STATE's legal counsel was "there were no classified information contained in the thirty thousand e-mails".

b3 per ODNI
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

[redacted] was willing to assist the FBI further as needed.

b3 per ODNI
b6 per FBI
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DATE 10-12-2016 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/20/2015

[redacted] United States Department of State, Office of Inspector General (STATE IG), 2121 Virginia Avenue, NW, Suite 8100, Washington, D.C. 20037, telephone (202) [redacted] email [redacted]@state.gov, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed in person by FBI Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] in her office. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] began working for STATE IG in [redacted] as [redacted] In [redacted] she became [redacted] Evaluations and Special Projects unit, which consisted of approximately 10 people from both STATE IG and the Intelligence Community Inspector General (ICIG). [redacted] worked on Congressional requests and other special inquiries that are handled by STATE IG, which included a special project related to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) process as a whole. b6 b7C

[redacted] STATE IG were in the process of conducting a review at STATE, focused on three main areas. Those areas were how 1) STATE records are preserved; 2) how STATE employees handled the FOIA process; and 3) the on-boarding process for new STATE employees, specific to methods of communication, with an emphasis on the Secretaries of State. As part of that review, [redacted] sent a questionnaire in late March 2015 to the former Secretaries of State Madeleine ALBRIGHT, Colin POWELL, Condoleezza RICE, and Hillary CLINTON along with current Secretary of State John KERRY. The questionnaire specifically asked them about their use of personal email for work purposes. b6 b7C

On April 15, 2015 STATE IG sent out requests to a broad number of STATE-related persons, including former staff members and others who may have sent or received work-related emails to or from the personal email accounts of the former Secretaries of State. The request asked for personal emails and any policy or training given related to the use of personal email for business purposes. [redacted] had not yet received any email files from any of the staff members of the former Secretaries of State and was told that there would be no response to the request by the attorney of Bryan PAGLIANO, former information technology advisor for CLINTON. b6 b7C

CLINTON sent out an all-staff cable that personal email should not be used day-to-day for business purposes and that personal email is not secure, so do not use them for business purposes. To the

Investigation on 08/19/2015 at Washington, DC b3 b7E

File # [redacted] Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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best of [redacted] recollection, CLINTON sent that cable out in 2009. After CLINTON's time as Secretary of State, there was also STATE guidance that if STATE employees had to use their personal email for business purposes they should send a carbon copy (Cc) to their ".gov" work email as well.

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In August 2014, STATE Under Secretary for Management Patrick KENNEDY sent out a memorandum for STATE employees not to use personal email for business purposes, but it did not address whether personal servers may be used for business purposes. There was STATE guidance that all information/emails related to work should be on an "approved automated system," but there was no known STATE guidance regarding the use of personal servers to conduct business. That will be an official "finding" by [redacted] colleague [redacted] STATE IG.

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[redacted] stated [redacted] interviewed PAGLIANO's former boss while at STATE, and PAGLIANO's former boss was unaware PAGLIANO set-up CLINTON's personal work server for her. There were no on-boarding policies in place to prevent what happened related to CLINTON using a personal server. STATE IG was unsure what, if any, site survey or systems security and maintenance checks were conducted prior to the installation of CLINTON's server by PAGLIANO. STATE IG was also unsure if anyone else other than STATE employees knew of, ever saw, or had access to the server.

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All of STATE's top officials' email records related to their ".gov" emails were being preserved, or "journaled," no matter what. Most STATE employees, those not considered top officials, could create email records themselves using the SMART system. The onus was on the regular STATE employees to self-determine what a record is and if they didn't use the SMART system and they've double-deleted the email, it was more than likely not going to be preserved.

Regarding STATE IG's review and interaction with KENNEDY, [redacted] had met KENNEDY several times, and stated KENNEDY was never overly uncooperative and never did anything unusual with regards to his cooperation. However, KENNEDY's tone and tenor were definitely not positive when dealing with STATE IG. [redacted] also attended meetings with KENNEDY in the past that discussed general goals going forward for STATE with regards to STATE IG's review.

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[redacted] review led her to interview STATE officials who worked the FOIA process from within the Bureau of Administration, Office of Information Programs and Services, which fell under KENNEDY's purview. Some FOIA officials have seen events and behaviors they did not like or that made them uncomfortable, to include KENNEDY's attitude toward them and how they handled the FOIA process related to CLINTON. Additionally, there was a request from the FOIA officials to STATE employees that asked for any emails sent to or from personal email accounts related to the CLINTON FOIA request. Some STATE employees responded they had no emails that fit the request; despite the negative response, for some STATE employees, FOIA officials knew there were at least some emails that should have been included in their response because the FOIA officials had already reviewed those emails

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from within the batch of 30,000 CLINTON-related emails. Despite knowing some STATE employees had not responded correctly, the FOIA officials had no recourse to compel a positive response.

For the FOIA request related to the 30,000 CLINTON-related emails and the Congressional inquiry that requested Benghazi-related emails, those review process were handled outside the normal chain of people. [redacted] did not know why these requests were handled outside the normal chain of people, but [redacted] b5 per DOS

[redacted] recommended the FBI talk to [redacted] for more information on events discussed above and for names of other people the FBI would be interested in talking with regarding the same. b6 b7C

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DATE 10-12-2016 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/26/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On May 25, 2016, [redacted] Special Agent, United States Secret Service (USSS), was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] Also present for the interview was a Federal Law Enforcement Association (FLEOA) Attorney and USSS SA [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was assigned to the protective detail of WILLIAM CLINTON from [redacted] to [redacted] Because of [redacted] information technology (IT) skills, he was asked to do network assessments and troubleshoot IT issues at the Clinton Foundation. From [redacted] to [redacted] assisted the Clinton Foundation in a case related to theft of information on the Clinton Foundation information systems. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was contacted by JUSTIN COOPER in January 2011 to assist with the security of an email server at the Clinton residence in Chappaqua, New York. [redacted] did not physically or remotely access the server in the residence at Chappaqua [redacted] was not aware of the hardware components of the server or software installed on the server. [redacted] conducted open source research relating to the security of email servers and contacted BRYAN PAGLIANO to recommend adding outbound IP filtering to the server. [redacted] received PAGLIANO's name and contact information from COOPER. [redacted] was aware of no other information pertaining to the email server located in Chappaqua. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) Notes of the interview will be maintained in a FD340 envelope and filed with the captioned investigation.

Investigation on 05/25/2016 at Boston, Massachusetts b3 b7E

File # [redacted] 302 ~93 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 09/17/2015

On September 17, 2015, [redacted] United States Department of State (DoS), 2025 E. Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20520, was interviewed by FBI Special Agen[redacted] and Information Technology Specialist / Forensic Examiner [redacted] Also present was [redacted] DoS, office telephone 202[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewers and the nature of the interview [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

The DoS email system uses a hub and spoke configuration. There are approximately 120,000 mailboxes on the system, of which approximately 95,000 are for unique users. The other 25,000 mailboxes are general mailboxes and aren't assigned to a specific user. Approximately 35,000 mailboxes reside on the local hub and are administered by Information Resource Management (IRM). The remainder of the mailboxes reside on spokes within the system and are not controlled by IRM. Spoke mailboxes, such as those at overseas posts, are administered by the local Information Security Officer and backup procedures vary by site.

Upon receiving the preservation request from the FBI, IRM preserved and thereafter exported the mailboxes for all of the individuals listed on the request whose mailboxes are on the IRM system. [redacted] estimated that approximately 400 of the 900 accounts listed on the preservation request are active users on the IRM system, with the other accounts residing on spokes, POEMS, or are associated with users who are no longer at DoS. Each exported mailbox includes all of the active mail folders as well as any items in the Recoverable Items storage area of Microsoft Exchange, which retains items for 90 days after they are deleted by the user. The export does not include any files, or mailboxes, that may have been archived by the user to their local desktop. b6 b7C

The IRM operating system is backed up and retained for approximately 30 days. However, the email database is not part of the backup. For email recovery, IRM uses Database Availability Groups (DAG) whereby five dynamic copies of each mailbox are maintained, at two sites, to allow the system to be quickly restored if the primary database fails.

[redacted] opined that the exported mailboxes were unlikely to contain many emails from prior to 2012. Prior to that time mailboxes were limited to 500MB of data and users were regularly required to b6 b7C

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delete old emails, or to create Personal Storage Folders (.pst files), when they hit the storage limit. Between 2012 and 2013, the storage limits were increased to 5GB.

IRM uses the State Messaging and Archival Retrieval Tool (SMART) to archive record emails. The system was implemented in phases between 2008 and 2010 and replaced CableXpress for archiving cables and record emails. [redacted] noted that communications sent to an embassy are referred to as a cable and emails sent to a person are record emails. SMART requires the users to identify an email as meeting the record standard and then selecting the appropriate SMART tags within Outlook while composing the email. The period of retention for a SMART record is dependent on the tags selected by the user.

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[redacted] provided that S/ES-IRM, also commonly referred to as the POEMS system, does not use the SMART system to archive email records. They are instead obligated to follow the 'print and file' policy. [redacted] further noted that records for senior officials are archived when they leave office. [redacted] recommended contacting Deputy Assistant Secretary MARGERET (PEGGY) GRAFELD, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Global Information Services (A/GIS) for more information on this process.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is responsible for administering the mailboxes on the top secret network at DoS. [redacted] provided that [redacted] telephone 202[redacted], would be able to provide further details on INR and the top secret mail system.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/22/2015

On September 21, 2015, [redacted] United States Department of State (STATE), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, 1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 800, Arlington, VA 22209, office telephone 703 [redacted] fax 703 [redacted] email address [redacted]@state.gov called the writer, Information Technology Specialist/Forensic Examiner (ITS/FE) [redacted] of the Washington Field Office (WFO) Computer Analysis Response Team (CART). b6 b7C

The writer asked [redacted] to provide general information regarding a group of fifty (50) email messages of interest that were found by [redacted] during his review of the Microsoft Outlook Personal Storage Folders (.pst files, or "mailboxes") for HUMA M. ABEDIN and CHERYL D. MILLS. [redacted] confirmed that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) previously received a full copy of the two (2) mailboxes on a Lexar thumb drive provided by [redacted] from STATE. b6 b7C

[redacted] stated that he performed a search across the email data for the words "Secret" and "NOFORN" using a search program called "Perceptive Search" and that the search returned fifty documents of interest. [redacted] believed that most of the search hits appeared within the metadata of Microsoft Word documents, which he identified as "Call Sheets," or documents provided to the Secretary of State prior to attending briefings with foreign dignitaries. [redacted] believed the search hits appeared within the metadata of the documents and not within the actual content of the documents. The identified documents were sent as attachments to emails. [redacted] could not remember if there were also search hits within any email messages. b6 b7C

[redacted] believed that the documents may have been generated from a classified system and that at some point they may have been moved to an unclassified system. However, he was unsure whether the "Secret" and "NOFORN" markings would have been generated automatically by the system that was used to create the documents. [redacted] stated that STATE had not yet determined how the documents would have been marked with regard to classification. b6 b7C

The writer requested that [redacted] provide the FBI with the file names and Message-Digest algorithm 5 (MD5) hash values for the files identified by STATE. [redacted] advised that STATE was in the process of moving the email data onto a stand-alone computer within a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) and that he anticipated this would happen b6 b7C

Investigation on 09/21/2015 at Washington, DC b3 b7E

File # [redacted] 302 – 8 Date dictated N/A

By ITS/FE [redacted]

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toward the end of the week (on or around September 25, 2015) [redacted] stated that he would coordinate with [redacted] OIG, STATE, telephone 703- [redacted] email address [redacted]@state.gov to obtain and provide the FBI with the MD5 hash values of the identified files and that he would contact the writer when this process was complete.

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DATE 10-12-2016 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 6/23/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On June 23 2016, [redacted], date of birth [redacted], was telephonically interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted]. Also present for the call was [redacted] counsel [redacted], Attorney at Law. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] had no new information regarding the whereabouts of the laptop that was shipped by [redacted] from Platte River Networks (PRN) to the Clinton Foundation in April of 2014. [redacted] was not sure who the mailroom manager for the Clinton Foundation was at that time but offered to contact the foundation to inquire about the shipment. [redacted] confirmed that the address of the Clinton Foundation was 1271 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor, New York, NY 10020. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) Following her January 2016 interview, [redacted] provided the FBI an email chain from April 2014 with the subject "RE: HRC emails." [redacted] had not reviewed the email chain prior to this call and could not immediately access the email so the interviewing agent read the chain to [redacted] to refresh her memory. Upon hearing the content of the email, [redacted] provided that she recalled having a discussion with [redacted] about remotely accessing the HILLARY CLINTON email archive via the internet. However, [redacted] could not recall if she actually accessed the email archive remotely thereafter. [redacted] believed that she may have taken notes about the process during the call and agreed to check her personal records for any relevant information. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) A copy of the original interview notes and the referenced email are attached in a 1A envelope.

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Investigation on 6/23/2016 at Washington, DC

File # [redacted] 302 ~84 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/27/2015

On October 27, 2015, [redacted] a Special Agent with Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Norfolk Virginia, (757) [redacted] was interviewed at the Norfolk Federal Building. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] was previously employed as an Agent at the Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), and assigned to former Secretary of State Rice's personal protection detail from [redacted] until January 2009. In January 2009 he was reassigned to former Secretary of State Clinton's detail. [redacted] served on Clinton's detail until [redacted] when he left the Department of State. b6 b7C

Clinton's tenure at State brought about significant changes to established security and diplomatic protocols owing to the dissimilar management styles and attitudes between Rice and Clinton. [redacted] claimed that his time on Clinton's detail was short and that he had no information to offer with regard to security violations or mishandling of classified information on the part of Clinton or her staff. [redacted] advised his recollections were vague regarding his time on Clinton's detail and that he could not recall specific events with clarity. [redacted] was aware that a Blackberry phone was kept in a desk drawer in Clinton's SCIF but could not say with any degree of certainty that the phone belonged to Clinton or that storing it in the SCIF was a security violation. [redacted] provided the name of [redacted] a former ASAC on Clinton's security detail as someone who may be in a position to provide additional insight. [redacted] was not familiar with the current whereabouts of [redacted] b6 b7C

Investigation on 10/27/2015 at Norfolk, VA b3 b7E

File # [redacted] - 302 - 26 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/06/2015

On November 6, 2015, [redacted] Senior Special Agent, Office of Investigations, Office of the Inspector General (OIG), United States Department of State (STATE), office telephone 703 [redacted] cell 202 [redacted] email address [redacted]@state.gov called the writer, Information Technology Specialist/Forensic Examiner (ITS/FE) [redacted] of the Washington Field Office (WFO) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Computer Analysis Response Team (CART). b6 b7C

[redacted] stated that he located an email containing content from a "confidential cable" sent from a Microsoft "Hotmail" email account to the STATE email address for Huma Abedin (AbedinH@state.gov) that could be found in the data contained within evidence item 1B26 provided by STATE to the FBI on or around August 14, 2015. Evidence item 1B26 is further described as a white and grey Lexar USB 3.0 thumb drive labeled with a sticker containing the words "Dept of State 703-312-3856." [redacted] stated that when the email was received in 2011, the information was classified and that it was supposed to be declassified in 2013 but that he did not know if that was the case and did not know the current classification of the document. b6 b7C

On November 6, 2015, [redacted] sent the writer an email containing information to assist in locating the identified email in the FBI data set in evidence item 1B26. A copy of the email is included in a 1A envelope. b6 b7C

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Investigation on 11/06/2015 at Washington, DC

File # [redacted]-02-27 Date dictated N/A

By ITS/FE [redacted] b6 b7C

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